Emerging African Economies:Digital Structures, Disruptive Responses and Demographic Implications by Nwaobi, Godwin
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Emerging African Economies:Digital
Structures, Disruptive Responses and
Demographic Implications
Nwaobi, Godwin
VERITAS UNIVERSITY ABUJA, QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC
RESEARCH BUREAU NIGERIA
3 October 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96317/
MPRA Paper No. 96317, posted 09 Oct 2019 07:48 UTC
1 
 
EMERGING AFRICAN ECONOMIES: DIGITAL STRUCTURES, 
DISRUPTIVE RESPONSES AND DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GODWIN CHUKWUDUM NWAOBI 
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMETRICS 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
VERITAS UNIVERSITY 
FCT, ABUJA, NIGERIA 
WEST AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+234 8035925021 
gcnwaobi@quanterb.org 
gcnwaobi@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCTOBER, 2019 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
 Indeed, the world economy is a complex system that has undergone many 
different phases in the past century. Particularly, the African economy is 
undergoing a series of transformations (transitions) that subject the future to 
considerable uncertainty, complexity and unpredictability. In fact, some 
transformations are cyclical while others are longer-term and more structural in 
nature. Yet, these transitions or emergence interact in shaping the future; making 
extrapolation from the past an increasingly unreliable source for future 
predictions. Thus unlike the previous revolutions, the fourth industrial revolution 
is characterized by the emergence of various technologies such as virtual 
(augmented) realities, nanotechnologies, 3D printing, machine learning, big data, 
cloud computing, drones, autonomous vehicles, robotics, artificial intelligence 
and blockchain technologies. Again, in this digitization era, work is constantly 
reshaped by technological progress, while firms adopt new ways of production 
and markets expand. In other worlds, digital technology brings opportunity, pave 
the way to create new jobs and increase productivity. Unfortunately, this paper 
argued that while the digital revolution has forged ahead, its analog complements 
(regulated entry and competition, new economy skills access and accountable 
institutions) have not kept pace in Africa. Consequently, African governments 
should formulate digital development strategies that are much broader than 
current ICTs strategies. That is, they should create a policy and institutional 
environment for technology that fosters the greatest benefits to African people of 
twenty-first century and beyond.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION  
In the age of the fourth industrial revolution, a new global architecture may be 
needed to enshrine international cooperation, overcome rising social polarization 
and protect the environment. This is in addition to a new social contract between 
governments and citizens; going beyond social safety nets and targets affordable 
and scalable access to education as well as mobility of works and workers plus new 
economic models that combine the narratives of wealth creation and wealth 
distribution. Indeed, Africa is embracing digital revolution and most enterprises are 
providing a wide range of services from e-commerce to fintech and cloud 
computing for their customers while other services offered includes ride-hailing, 
logistics and digital payments. Again, some enterprises are exploiting recent 
advances in artificial intelligence, robotics, cryptography and big data that promise 
to reshape the global economy and fundamentally alter the way we live and work. 
In fact, Africa digital revolution is rippling across industries from retailing and 
banking to manufacturing and transportation. However, the continent will face 
distinct challenges as the new technologies disrupt global value chains (network of 
interlinked stages of production for the manufacture of goods and services) and 
undermine the model of labor intensive, export-led natural resources that has 
powered the region‟s growth.  
 However, these new technologies are expected to open new opportunities for 
small business while offering the potential of enhanced productivity that is needed 
by African economies in order to move beyond low-income status. Notably, E-
commerce has the potential to support growth and make it more sustainable. And 
for consumers, e-commerce may translate into better access to a wider range of 
products and services at lower prices via consumption booting. While for firms, e-
commerce provides new business opportunities and access to larger markets which 
supports investment. Again, financial technologies (Fintech) can support potential 
growth and poverty reduction by strengthening financial development, inclusion 
and efficiency. Essentially, fintech can help millions of individuals as well as small 
and medium sized enterprises leapfrog a mess to financial services at an affordable 
cost in poor African countries. In fact, these technologies may drive substantial 
efficiency gains in the financial sector by providing cross-border payments that 
reduce both risk and cost for participants. Again digitalization presents 
opportunities for improving public finance; since adaption of digitalization by 
governments can (through better reporting of transactions) increase revenue from 
value-added taxes (VAT), tariffs and other sources.  
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 Yet, these new technologies are automating increasingly complex activities 
that could previously be performed only by people. Thus, major transitions lie 
ahead that could match the scale of historical shifts out of agriculture and 
manufacturing which creates new challenges for policy makers. Certainly, this new 
wave of creative destruction will transform jobs and skills (with old jobs and firms 
disappearing while new ones emerging). Historically, African adjustment to change 
his been difficult with gains unevenly spread. This is because of the fact that the 
continent has been largely dismissed as a case of regional economic delinquency 
with levels of growth necessary to reduce poverty and inequality deemed to be 
consistently unattainable. Consequently, as a global agenda, all countries and 
stakeholders (acting in collaborative partnership) decided to implement the 2030 
sustainable development goals (SDG). Essentially, United Nations (2015) resolved 
to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty as well as healing and securing 
the earth planet by shifting the world unto a sustainable and resilient path. 
Conceptually, this plan led to the emergence of 17 SDG‟s and 169 targets.  
Specially, the aim of goal nine is to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization and faster innovation. Here, the key target is to 
significantly increase access to information and communication technology while 
strive to provide universal and affordable access to the internet in least developed 
countries (inclusive of Africa).  
 As a driver for economic growth, global digital connectivity is essentially 
seen as having significant potential to help attain the sustainable development goals. 
Although, there is evidence that some poor people benefit (economically and 
socially) from connectivity; such initiatives do not go to scale or unsustainable 
(World Bank, 2016). In other words, large numbers of poor people generally do not 
benefit appropriately from such digital interventions. In fact, without such 
connectivity, people do not even have the chance to benefit from the potential of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). Notably, an increasingly 
digitally marginalized and disenfranchised population constitutes a danger to the 
sustained economic growth that dominates global (continental) agenda on 
development.  
 Certainly, this observed situation requires appropriate policies by 
governments at all scales and in particular through their regulatory mechanisms as 
well as private sector and civil-society engagements. Therefore, at this moment of 
change, when people look to connectivity to bring about sustainable (inclusive) 
digital economic development; we intend to analyze divergent wears about digital 
economies outside global centers. As a research focus, this paper will show how 
5 
 
those processes are inherently political, socially embedded, path dependent and 
highly uneven in the African context. The rest of the paper is organized as follow: 
The second section presents the state of African Economies; the third section 
focuses on digital revolution, foundation and structures; the fourth sections 
dedicated to the digital evidence in Africa; the fifth section presents the disruptive 
responses in Africa while demographic implications are shown in section six. 
Policy options are presented in section seven while the last section concludes the 
study with emphasis on challenges and prospects.  
 
2.0  STATE OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES  
Spatially, Africa is the second largest of the earth‟s continents and perhaps 
the most diverse of any continent‟s inhabitants (with thousands of ethnic groups and 
different languages). At independence, Africans had high hopes of rapid 
development and starting from a low base; African countries significantly raised life 
expectancy expanded literacy and improved health care. Notably, in 1961, overall 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.4 percent and the pace 
quickened after 1967. But as the 1970s advanced countries began to stumble and by 
the 1980s, output was actually declining (World Bank, 1989). In fact, during this 
period, African‟s generally poor performance were reflected in weak growth in the 
productive sectors, poor export performance, mounting debt, deteriorating social 
conditions, environmental degradation as well as increasing decay of institutional 
capacity. Here, both domestic and external factors contributed to the disappointing 
overall performance. Again, all countries in the region were confronted with deep 
rooted developmental constraints (rapid population growth, low human capital 
development and inadequate infrastructure) which constituted major impediments 
to private sectors development and the supply response of the economies.  
 Furthermore, ethnic conflicts, political instability, adverse security conditions 
and protracted civil wars aggravated the economic performance of several 
countries. Regrettably, governance concerns were compounded by the legacy of 
repressive regimes in several countries; by bloated and inefficient public 
administration; by ineffective judicial systems as well as by complex administrative 
(institutional) frameworks. Again, inappropriate policies which resulted in relative 
price distortions in most of the key sectors adversely affected economic incentives 
and production. Basically, the price distortions combined with the severe external 
shocks of the 1970/80s (declining terms of trade, drying up of foreign capital 
inflows and rising world interest rates) weakened many economies of Africa 
(Elbadawi, Ghura and Uwujaran, 1992; Gura and Hadjimichael, 1996). 
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 Consequently, the failure of many countries in the 1970s and early 1980s to 
accommodate the adverse effects of negative external shocks compounded the 
negative impact of these shocks. Hence the urgent need to address the short-term 
balances of payment crises as well as medium to long-term productivity 
improvements. Thus, the World Bank structural adjustment programs were 
designed to enable countries reform their policies in order to boost the various 
sectors. However, United Nations agencies criticized adjustment programmes for 
their neglect of the human dimensions and elements. Subsequently, a joint initiative 
called Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was launched by the joint 
institutions (in 1990s) to fight against poverty at the heart of growth and 
development policies (World Bank, 2002). Unfortunately, these partnerships 
between Africa and international organizations did not yield the expected 
development of the African nations.  
 Yet, other existing partnerships or initiatives include United Nations New 
Agenda for the plan of Action; IMF-led Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; Japan – 
led Tokyo Agenda for Action; African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) led Global Compact with Africa; United 
Nations Millennium Declaration (MDG); G8 Okinawa Declaration; Copenhagen 
Declaration; Skagen Declaration; Cotonou Agreement; TIKAD; SINO-AFRICAN 
PROCESS, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); Everything but Arms 
(EBA); New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD); Senegal‟s 
Millennium Partnership for Africa‟s recovery program (MAP); New African 
Initiative (NAI); Organization of African Unity (OAU) and African Development 
Bank (ADB) as instruments for fostering African development, Unity and Growth. 
Later, the above commitment was reiterated in the Lagos plan of action and Abuja 
Treaty which envisions the ultimate creation of the African Economic Community 
(African Union) in Lusaka. 
 However, the desire to overcome the establishment of various treaties and 
regional institution with overriding objective of creating self-reliant development of 
member states. These include: CUSTOMS AND ECONOMIC UNION OF 
CENTRAL AFRICA (UDEAC) OR CENTRAL AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY COMMUNITY (CEMAC); EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
(EAC);SOUTH AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION (SACU);SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING CONFERENCE (SADCC);SOUTHERN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC); COMMON MARKET FOR 
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (COMESA);WEST AFRICAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNNITY (CEAO); ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST 
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AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS); WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY UNION (UEMUA);PREFERENTIAL TRADE AREA (PTA) AND  
ARAB Maghred Union (AMU). 
Despite the dismal outcome from the above generation of integration 
initiatives, current integration initiatives were broading the objectives of economic 
cooperation and regional integration to include and emphasize the coordination and 
harmonization of macroeconomic policies.  
 Although, the 1980s are often referred to as the continents host decade; the 
mid-1990s socioeconomic indicators (poverty, inequality, access to social services, 
institution development, and infrastructure levels) remain weak in Africa as well as 
typically lag behind developing nations in other regions of the world (Collier and 
Gunning 1999). Table 2.1 presents an overview of inflation, exchange rates, current 
and fiscal accounts, external debt as well as real GDP per capita for the various 
African sub-regions (Bhorat et.al, 2015). And clearly, over this period, these 
economic regions experienced slight exchange rate depreciation against the United 
States dollars. And subsequently, the exchange rate stabilized towards their 
equilibrium value. Yet, despite significant currency depreciation, exports did not 
increase sufficiently to improve the current account balance. Again, table 2.1 
demonstrates that most regions experienced real annual GDP growth exceeding four 
percent between the periods 2000 and 2014 with the exception of South Africa (as 
the most dominant economy) which experienced contractions.  
 However, Africa‟s economic growth continued to deteriorate in 2016 due 
mainly to lower commodity prices. Specifically, Africa‟s growth slowed to 2.2% in 
2016, down from 3.4% in 2015 (ADB, 2017). In the wake of challenges emanating 
from falling commodity prices and shrinking revenues; some African 
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TABLE 2.1 AFRICA MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW (1990 – 2014) 
S/
N 
Macroeconomic 
Indicators 
Period 
Average
s 
Central  
Africa  
(CA) 
East 
Africa 
(EA) 
North 
Africa 
(NA) 
Southern 
Africa 
(SA) 
West 
Africa 
(WA) 
1. Inflation (%)  1990-
1994 
2000-
2004 
2010-
2013 
923.05 
28.59 
3.15  
17.58 
4.43 
4.57  
11.21 
2.04 
4.94  
78.5 
21.55 
7.25 
11.43 
4.77 
5.44  
2. Official Exchange  
(PER US$) 
1990-
1994 
2000-
2004 
2010-
2013  
284.13 
596.12 
553.94  
174.13 
411.55 
553.94  
22.22 
36.60 
61.17 
3.83 
22.06 
243.12 
253.35 
648.79 
933.39  
3. Current Account  
Balance (% of 
GDP) 
2005-
2009 
2010-
2012 
22.50 
- 1.55  
- 6.67 
- 7.86  
7.95  
0.78 
- 5.55  
- 9.50  
- 7.21  
- 11.00  
4. Fiscal Balance  
(% of GDP)  
1990-
1994  
2000-
2004 
2010-
2012  
-3.82 
1.98  
4.46  
- 3.29 
- 3.88  
- 2.55  
2.78 
5.25  
2.74  
- 3.50  
- 2.02  
- 0.70 
- 0.66  
- 2.66  
- 2.65  
5. External Debt 
Stocks 
(% of GNI)   
1990-
1994 
2000-
2004  
2010-
2013  
113.36  
129.74  
24.02  
86.51 
79.06  
45.75  
92.58 
67.16  
36.87  
111.12 
72.69  
32.48  
116.91  
166.08  
43.51  
6. Real GDP  
(% Change) 
1990-
2000 
2000-
2014 
0.50 
5.80 
2.80 
9.10 
4.60 
2.20 
2.00 
3.90  
2.40 
6.40  
7. GDP Per Capita  1990- 1.80 - 2.1  5.80  1.80  1.30 
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(% Change)  2000 
2000-
2014  
3.20 12.60  0.00 - 0.80  1.90  
 
governments had to operate within an increasingly constrained fiscal space. Thus, 
as a result of commodity price falls, the overall fiscal deficit for the continent 
weakened from 6.3% in 2015 to 6.6% in 2016 as well as falling from 5.5% in 2017 
to 4.5% in 2018 (by projection) as shown in table 2.2 (ADB, 2017). Although the 
recovery in sub-saharan Africa continued in 2018, activity lost momentum in 
several countries. Unfortunately, this reflected a sluggish expansion in the region‟s 
largest economies (Angola, Nigeria and South Africa). In fact, the region faced a 
more difficult external environment in 2018 as global trade growth moderated; 
financing conditions tightened and United States dollar strengthened. In contrast, 
growth in the other regions of Africa was generally steady; although performance 
varied between country groups.  
 Structurally, growth in some of the Africa countries is anticipated to pickup 
in 2019 and subsequently in 2020/2021 (as shown in table 2.3). This is predicated 
on diminished policy uncertainty and improved investment in large economies as 
well as continued robust growth in non-resource intensive countries. However, per 
capita income growth is predicted to remain well below its long-term average in 
many countries (World Bank, 2019). Again, inflation is expected to pick up across 
the region in 2019 reflecting the pass-through of currency depreciations and 
domestic price pressures. In contrast, fiscal balances are expected to improve 
further, reflecting fiscal consolidation efforts among the large oil exporters 
continued adjustment in some countries. Notably, policy tightening is likely to yield 
smaller fiscal deficits in metal exporters while fiscal deficits in non-resource-
intensive countries should continue to narrow as public investment spending slows 
to stabilize public debt.  
 As a risk factor, shower-than-projected growth in China and Europe (which 
have strong trade and investment links with Africa) would adversely affect the 
region through lower export demand and investment. Furthermore, a faster than-
expected normalization of advanced-economy monetary policy could result in sharp 
reductions in capital inflows, higher financing costs and disorderly exchange rate 
depreciations (such as in countries with weaker fundamentals or higher political 
risks). Clearly, sharp currency declines would make the serving of foreign-
currency-denominated debt more challenging. Again, the increased reliance on 
foreign currency borrowing has heightened refinancing and interest rate risk in 
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debtor countries. In fact, the rise in non-resident participation in domestic debt 
markets has exposed  
 
 
TABLE 2.2 AFRICA MACRO ECONOMIC OVERVIEW (2015 – 2018) 
S/N Indicator   Period  Centra
l 
Africa  
East  
Afric
a  
North 
Africa  
Souther
n  
Africa  
West  
Africa  
African  
Region  
1.  Real GDP 
Growth (%)  
2015  
2016 
2017 
2018 
3.6 
0.8 
2.2 
3.8 
6.5 
5.3 
5.7 
6.0 
3.3 
3.0 
3.4 
3.7 
1.9 
1.1 
1.9 
2.6 
3.3 
0.4 
3.5 
5.5 
3.4 
2.2 
3.4 
4.3  
2.  Consumer Prices  
(Inflation In %)  
2015 
2016  
2017 
2018 
2.2 
3.1 
2.2 
2.4  
10.2  
12.4  
9.9 
8.9 
7.5 
8.1 
10.3 
8.2 
5.7 
10.5 
8.7 
7.7 
8.3 
13.0 
11.4 
9.8 
7.4 
10.1 
9.8 
8.3 
3.  Overall Fiscal 
Balance 
(% GDP)  
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
-2.9 
-4.0  
-3.5  
2.4  
-5.1 
-4.7 
-4.5  
-3.3  
-13.3 
-13.5 
-11.1 
-9.5 
-3.9 
-4.3 
-3.8 
-3.2  
-2.0 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.5  
-6.3 
-6.6 
-5.5 
-4.5  
4.  External Current  
Account (% 
GDP) 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
-7.4 
-8.1 
-5.9 
-5.1  
-7.7 
-7.0 
-7.6 
-8.2  
-9.1 
-9.8 
-7.5 
-5.8  
-6.2 
-6.4 
-5.4 
-4.9 
-4.1 
-2.8 
-0.9 
 0.3  
-6.8 
-6.5 
-5.0 
-4.1  
 
TABLE 2.3 AFRICA GROWTH FORCAST (2019 – 2012): SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
S/
N 
Country  2019 202
0 
202
1 
S/N Country  2019 2020 2021 
1.  ANGOLA  2.9 2.6 2.8 33 RWANDA 7.8 8.0 8.0 
2.  BENIN 6.2 6.5 6.6 34 SENEGAL 6.6 6.8 6.9 
3.  BOTSWANA 3.9 4.1 4.1 35 SEYCHELLES 3.4 3.3 2.9 
4.  BURKINA FASO 6.0 6.0 6.0 36 SIERRA 
LEONE 
5.1 6.3 6.3 
5.  BRUNDI  2.3 2.5 2.8 37 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
1.3 1.7 1.8 
6.  CABO VERDE 4.7 4.9 4.9 38 SUDAN 3.6 3.8 3.8 
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7.  CAMEROON  4.2 4.5 4.5 39 TANZANIA 6.8 7.0 7.0 
8.  CHAD  4.6 6.1 4.9 40 TOGO 4.8 5.1 5.1 
9.  COMOROS 3.1 3.1 3.1 41 UGANDA 6.0 6.4 6.5 
10. CONGO DEM 
REP 
4.6 5.5 5.9 42 ZAMBIA 3.6 3.8 3.8 
11. CONGO REP 3.2 -0.1 -1.5 43 ZIMBABWE  3.7 4.0 4.0 
12. COTE D‟IVORE 7.3 7.4 6.8      
13. EQUATURIAL 
GUINEA 
-2.1 -5.8 -5.6      
14. ESWANNI 1.7 1.8 1.8      
15. ETHIOPIA 8.8 8.9 8.9      
16. GABON 3.0 3.7 3.7      
17. GAMBIA 5.4 5.2 5.2      
18. GHANA  7.3 6.0 6.0      
19. GUINEA 5.9 6.0 6.0      
20. GUINEA-
BISSAU 
4.2 4.4 4.5      
21. KENYA  5.8 6.0 6.0      
22. LESOTHO 1.2 0.2 1.8      
23. LIBERIA 4.5 4.8 4.8      
24. MADAGASCAR 5.4 5.3 5.3      
25. MALAWI 4.3 5.3 5.5      
26. MALI 5.0 4.9 4.8      
27. MAURITANIA 4.9 6.9 6.9      
28. MAURITIUS 4.0 3.6 3.6      
29. MUZAMBI QUE 3.5 4.1 4.1      
30. NAMBIA 1.8 2.1 2.1      
31. NIGER 6.5 6.0 5.6      
32. NIGERIA  2.2 2.4 2.4       
 
some countries to the risk of sudden capital outflows. Similarly, in some countries, 
sizable loans to state-owned enterprises (backed by commodity exports) have 
increased the risk that a negative commodity price shock could trigger financial 
crises. In particular, domestic risks remain elevated where political uncertainty and 
a concurrent weakening of economic reforms could continue to weigh on the 
economic outlook in many African countries. In other words, domestic political 
considerations would undermine the commitment needed to uphold in fiscal deficits 
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or implement structural reforms (especially where public debt levels are high and 
rising). Unfortunately, insurgencies and armed conflicts with their adverse effects 
on economic activity remain an important risk in several African countries. Also, 
weather shocks and rising financial sector stress constitute major constraints on the 
emergence of these economies. On the other hand, pervasive informality contributes 
to lower government tax revenues which limits the fiscal resource available for 
much-needed public investments and socio-economic programs.  
 
3.0  DIGITAL REVOLUTION: FOUNDATION AND STRUCTURES  
Indeed, digital technologies (internet, mobile phones, other tools to collect, 
store, analyze and share information digitally) have spread rapidly in much of the 
world. Essentially, these technologies have dramatically expanded the information 
base; lowered information costs and created information goods. In fact, this has 
facilitated searching, matching and sharing of information and contributed to 
greater organization and collaboration among economic agents while influencing 
how firms operate, people seek opportunities and citizens interact with their 
governments (world bank, 2016). Technically, the internet promotes development 
through the following mechanisms: search and information (inclusion), automation 
and coordination (efficiency) and scale economies and platforms (innovation). 
Across these domains, four major enablers of digital technologies are digital 
finance, social media, social media, digital identity and data revolution (big data vs. 
open data).  
 Since technological change means that many routine tasks will be done by 
machines, skills development should start at birth and lasts a lifetime. In fact, this 
puts a premium on different types of skills that automation complements in a 
modern economy as shown in figure 3.1 (World Bank, 2016; Pierre, et. al 2014). 
However, figure 3.2 displays the indicators of infrastructure development as a 
means of assessing how broad or narrow the foundation is for the development of 
experience and skills. Clearly, a much undeveloped infrastructure provides a narrow 
base for the development of either production or consumption experience as well as 
a similarly specialized foundation for the skills application. Thus, experience with 
production and consumption operates to push the new technologies into roles in the 
creation of knowledge. Again, neither production nor consumption alone will bring 
infrastructure assets and experience into productivity use in the creation of 
knowledge. Basically, this requires „pull‟ influences from the production or 
consumption skills as represented by a second set of arrows leading to the skills 
level (Nwaobi, 2000; United Nations, 1998).  
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FIGURE 3.1 DIGITAL ECONOMY SKILLS FOUNDATION 
S/N COGNITIVE  SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL TECHNICAL  
1.  LITERACY, NUMERACY AND  
HIGHER-ORDER COGNITIVE  
SKILLS SUCH AS REASONING  
AND CREATIVE THINKING  
SOCIO EMOTIONAL SKILLS 
AND PERSONALITY TRAITS 
MANUAL DEXTERITY AND 
THE USE OF METHODS  
MATERIALS, TOOLS AND  
INSTRUMENTS  
2.  RAW PROBLEM-SOLVING  
ABILITY VERSUS KNOWLEDGE  
TO SOLVE PROBLEMS  
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, 
EXTRAVERSION 
AGREEABILITY, 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY  
TECHNICAL SKILLS,  
DEVELOPED THROUGH  
POSTSECONDARY 
SCHOOLING OR TRAINING 
OR ACQUIRED ON THE JOB 
3.  VERBAL ABILITY, NUMERACY,  
PROBLEM SOLVING, MEMORY  
AND MENTAL SPEED 
SELF-REGULATION, GRIT  
MIND-SET, DECISION  
MAKING AND INTE- 
PERSONAL SKILLS  
SKILLS RELATED TO  
SPECIAL OCCUPATIONS  
SUCH AS ENGINEER,  
ECONOMIST, IT SPECIALIST 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 INFRASTRUCTURES, EXPERIENCE AND SKILLS 
FRAMEWORK 
IDEAL KNOWLEDGE INDICATOR 
 
 
 
PRODUCTION               CONSUMPTION  
SKILLS „PULL‟ IN                SKILLS „PUSH‟  
GENERATING                IN GENERATING  
KNOWLEDGE               KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
PRODUCTION                CONSUMPTION  
SKILLS „PULL‟ IN                SKILLS „PUSH‟  
GENERATING                IN GENERATING 
KNOWLEDGE                 KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 
 
PRODUCTION SKILLS 
INDICATORS 
CONSUMPTION SKILLS  
INDICATORS  
CONSUMPTION  
INDICATORS  
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INDICATORS   
PRODUCTION  
INDICATORS 
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For the purpose of technology acquisition and exploitation, technology-
specific skills are needed which can be found from education and training system. 
Thus, we can distinguish between three diffusion phases and associated modes of 
technological usage. Here, substitution occurs when a new or improved technology 
merely substitutes for an existing one. Similarly, enhancement occurs when the new 
technology leads to substantial performance enhancement while a third graduation 
exists where the adoption opens up opportunities for the redefinition of tasks via a 
whole sale transformation of work practices and organizational structures. Clearly, 
figure3.3 sets out the three I.T (information technology) diffusion phases or levels 
of IT in use. Basically, enhancement is the usual driver for technology adoption; 
substitution is the initial diffusion reality while transformation is the eventual 
realization of often unforeseen potential (Nwaobi, 1999; Hanna, et.al, 1995).  
 Specially, electronics (as largest and fastest growing industry) enables a 
veritable revolution in communications and information that lies at the root of 
modern economic development as well as emerging digital economies. Essentially, 
the output of the electronics industry comprises a wide variety of products ranging 
from the most sophisticated computer hardware and software to home appliances. 
As enabling technology of the information economy, the classifications of critical 
electronic products are shown in table 3.1 (Wellenius, 1993). Here, five subsectors 
of electronics are distinguished: telecommunications, computers, industrial 
consumer electronics and semiconductors. However, specific enterprises and 
products shift easily among subsectors and share common requisites for effective 
utility in market place. Basically, this shift can be characterized as a transition from 
a telephony world (in which technologies, applications and providers operated in 
separate store pipes) to an IP world (in which an ever increasing variety of 
combinations of technologies, applications and providers is possible. Consequently, 
the size of the internet infrastructure is a good indication of a country‟s progress 
towards information driven economy or digital economy.  
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FIGURE 3.3 INFORMATION DIFFUSION PHASES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.1 ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY PRODUCT CATEGORIES  
 
(A) CONSUMER ELECTRONICS  
VIDEO EQUIPMENT AUDIO 
EQUIPMENT 
HOME 
INFORMATION 
EQUIPMENT  
OTHERS  
MONOCHROME TV  AUDIO 
COMPONENTS 
HOME COMPUTERS  ELECTRONIC 
WATHES 
COLOR TELEVISION DIGITAL 
AUDIO 
COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE 
TOYS AND 
GAMES  
ADVANCED 
TELEVISION 
ADD-ON 
COMPONENTS  
COMPUTER 
ACCESSORIES 
MUSICAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
PROJECTION TV PACKAGED 
AUDIO  
SYSTEMS  
DEDICATED WORD  
PROCESSORS/TYPE- 
WRITER  
CHILDREN 
ELECTRONICS  
SUBSTITUTION  
UNDERSTAND AND 
DOCUMENT THE 
PROCESS TO BE IT 
ASSISTED  
SUBSTITUTE IT FOR 
EXISTING 
TECHNOLOGY   
REAP MODEST 
EFFECTIVENESS 
AND EFFICIENCY 
GAINED   
ENHANCEMENT  
REDESIGN PROCESS 
BASED ON INHERENT 
NEEDS AND/OR 
TECHNOLOGY 
OPPORTUNITIES  
CHANGE THE 
PROCESS WITH 
HELP OF IT   
OBTAIN LARGER 
EFFECTIVENESS 
AND EFFECIENCY 
GAINS    
TRANSFORMATONN  
REDEFINE THE ROLE OF 
THE PROCESS WITHIN  
THE LAGER  
PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM 
  
CHANGE THE  
STRUCTURE AND 
ORGANIZATION OF  
PRODUCTION AND  
POTENTIAL 
STRATEGY    
MAXIMIZE  
EFFECTIVENESS 
AND EFFECIENCY  
INCREASES  
16 
 
VIDEO SYSTEMS  AUDIO 
ACCESSORIES 
COMPACT 
FACSMILE 
HOME 
SECURITY  
SYSTEM  
VIDIO CASSETTE  
RECORDERS/PLAYERS 
AUDIO TYPE  
EQUIPMENT  
PERSONAL COPIERS  HEALTH CARE  
PRODUCTS  
CAMCORDERS  AUTO SOUND  TELEPHONES  CALCULATORS  
PERSONAL VIDEO  PORTABLE 
AUDIO 
CELLULAR 
TELEPHONE 
CEBUS OR  
INTELLIGENT 
HOME 
STILL VIDEO  
CAMERAS  
RADIO  ELECTRONIC  
ORGANIZERS  
 
VIDEO DISC SYSTEMS  ACCESSORIES  
VIDEO SOFTWARE  COMMUNNICATIONS  
VIDEOTEX SYSTEMS    
CAPTIONING     
HOME SATELITE     
EARTH STATIONS     
 
 
(B) COMPUTERS AND INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS  
COMPUTERS  PERIPHERAL  
EQUIPMENT 
INDUSTRIAL  
AUTOMATION  
ARTIFICIAL  
INTELLIGENCE  
OTHERS 
PERSONAL 
COMPUTERS 
STORAGE 
EQUIPMENT  
INDUSTRIAL 
CONTROLS 
ROBOTICS   INDUST
RAIL 
MATERI
ALS 
WORKSTATIONS  OPTICAL 
DISCK  
TECHNOLOGY  
ELECTRONIC  
TEMPERATURE  
CONTROLS 
MACHINE VISION  
MINICOMPUTERS  
SUPER 
MINICOMPUTERS  
COMPUTERS  
TERMINALS  
 MATERIALY 
HANDLING  
MAINFRAMES  PRINTERS   BAR CODING   
MINI-SUPER 
COMPUTERS 
SUPER 
COMPUTERS  
SOFTWARE  
AND  
OPERATING 
SYSTEMS  
 COMPUTER-AIDED  
DESIGN  
 
   COMPUTER-AIDED  
MANUFACTURING 
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   COMPUTER-AIDED  
ENGINEERING  
 
   COMPUTER-
INTEGRATED  
MANUFACTURING  
 
 
 
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT  
MAIN  NETWORKS OTHERS 
CENTRAL OFFICES  INTEGRATED SYSTEMS  
 
TELE TEXT 
VIDEOTEX  
FIBRE OPTICS  DIGITAL NETWORK  
FACSIMILE  NETWORK MANAGEMENT  
SYSTEMS  
LAND MOBILE 
RADIO 
MICROWAVE  
TRANSMISSION  
LOCAL AREA NETWORKS  
TELEPHONES 
ANSWERING 
MACHINES 
WIDE AREA NETWORKS   
CABLE TELEVISION  VALUE-ADDED NETWORS   
CELLULAR RADIO METRO AREA NETWORKS   
PBX, CENTREX, 
KEY  
STEMS  
  
DATA 
COMMUNICATION 
MODEM 
  
 
(C) ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS  
ELECTRON TUBES SOLID STATE PRODUCTS ELECTRONIC PARTS 
TELEVISION PICTURE  
TUBES  
DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTORS  CAPACITORS  
RECEIVING TUBES  INTEGRATED CIRCUITS  RESISTORS  
POWER AND SPECIAL  
PURPOSE TUBES  
OTHER SEMICONDUCTOR  
SERVICES  
NETWORKS  
SWITCHES & RELAYS 
HIGH VACUM, GAS AND  
VAPOR AND OTHER  
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
 ACCESSORY  
PARTS  
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TUBES 
ELECTRO-OPTICAL  
SERVICES  
 CONNECTORS  
MICROWAVE TUBES   TRANSFORMERS  
  QUARTZ DEVICES 
  FILTERS  
  PRINTED-CIRCUIT  
BOARDS  
  WIRE AND CABLE  
 
 
(D) ELECTRONIC-RELATED PRODUCTS AND SERVICES  
MAIN  PHOTOGRAPHIC  OTHERS  
AEROSPACE  PHOTOGRAPHIC 
EQUIPMENT 
 
AUTOMATIC 
CONTROLS 
OPTICAL EQUIPMENT CLOCKS AND  
WATCHES  
SYSTEM 
INTEGRATION  
AND COMPUTER  
SERVICES  
 MUSICAL  
INSTRUMENTS  
MOTOR VEHICLES    
ELECTRONIC-
RELATED  
OFFICE EQUIPMENT  
  
 
 Indeed, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are one of the 
most pervasive technologies in the world. However, they are superseded by the 
human brain in terms of intelligence or creativity. Thus, if it is assumed that wide 
diffusion of ICTs will occur and that African countries will possess extensive and 
well-functioning higher education sectors; then there is need for special skills and 
training consideration. In other words, there is need for a range of associated skills 
and training necessary to utilize, diffuse, maintain and benefit from them.  
However, lifelong learning means that people must be able to move into and out of 
formal education institutions at different stages of their working lives. Thus, new 
forms of certification and accreditation that are not based on hierarchies among 
institutions of education are necessary. Yet, the major goal of any initiative to 
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implement ICT applications in African countries will be to ensure that the 
applications are perceived by their users as being useful. 
 Although, the internet system is universally available and affordable, 
technological change is continuous and frequently disruptive. Consequently, there 
are modern technologies that promise to be far-reaching in their impact on 
development. Specifically, as the next generation of mobile networks, 5G networks 
are expected to outperform current 4G networks by providing data at a speed 
several hundred gigabits per second. Even though mobile technology has been in 
early existence, it is its combination with the internet that makes it a disruptive 
force. As one of the technologies with potentially greatest impact for the developing 
world, African countries need to closely follow its development and eventual 
adoption. Similarly, Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to computer systems that can 
perform tasks that normally require human intelligence (such as visual and speech 
recognition, decision making and language translation). Notably, faster computing, 
big data and better algorithms have helped propel recent breakthroughs in AI. While 
recognizing the potential risks of AI, such technologies can provide important 
insights and generate value in virtually every sector relevant to development. In 
fact, the benefits of AI are beginning to be seen in education (with personalized 
learning), in health (with deep diagnostics), in agriculture (with crop planning, 
precision farming and optimized resources application), in banking and finance 
(with customer service, risk management and compliance). However, advances in 
AI will prove to be disruptive, resulting in new opportunities for collaboration 
between humans and machines with loss of tradition jobs. 
 
ROBOTICS refers to machines or mechanical systems that can automatically 
handle tasks. Generally, it is divided into two groups: 
(A) Industrial Robots( automotive, chemical, rubber, plastics and food 
industries): 
(B) Service Robots (logistics, medicine, elderly assistance, agriculture, floor –
clearing, civil construction and exoskeletons). 
Essentially, Robots can provide benefits through their computing power, precision, 
strength and sensing capabilities. While robots have been primarily used in 
physically difficult or dangerous jobs, they are becoming more advanced and 
gaining senses, dexterity and intelligence. In fact, they are more compact, adaptable 
and intelligent; have manipulation capabilities and able to work along with humans. 
Eventually, they may displace or augment humans (such as in low skilled areas and 
high – tech fields). Basically, demand for industrial robotics is driven by the desire 
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to reduce labor costs and the need for accuracy in undertaking repetitive process. 
Fortunately, Robots are not paid nor get sick and they can work as long as power 
remains constant. Again, they can take on dangerous or risky tasks such as detecting 
landmine. However, the deployment of robots is expected to rise as a function of 
their falling costs and growing intelligence.  
 
 THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) refers to the interconnection of 
objects to internet infrastructure through embedded computing devices such as 
radio frequency identification (RFID) chips and sensors. Essentially, IOT products 
can be classified into five broad categories: wearable devices, smart homes, smart 
cities, environmental sensors, and business applications. Notably IOT is redefining 
service industry and unlocking opportunities in multiple areas: 
 
(A) Smart fitness sensors and trackers are transforming healthcare and improving 
personal fitness and health.  
(B) Embedded sensors accurately relay moisture, air and water pollution levels and 
resource levels while allowing for closer monitoring of environmental 
problems  
(C) Factories and supply chains use smart sensors to improve the efficiency of 
manufacturing and distribution of goods.  
(D) Marker spaces are created where people can gather to build and learn with 
electronics, software and digital fabrication. In fact, these spaces have 
democratized access to tools and participants empowerment to build and learn 
on their own.  
(E) Combating climate change and its effects. Surely, African farms can use 
intelligent sensors to monitor soil conditions and guide autonomous irrigation 
systems.  
(F) Smart traffic synchronization systems in cities can save on travel time and fuel 
consumption.  
(G) Deployed smart networks can use global positioning systems (GPS), sensor 
information from monitoring, cameras and other sources to sense population 
movements, ease traffic congestion as well as the-rusting traffic in the case of 
emergencies. Clearly, it is evident that IOT has the potential to revolutionize 
the way people live, work, interact and learn.  
 
3D PRINTING is a process where machines can print objects from digital files or 
scans which consist of adding successive layers of material to make a three 
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dimensional (3D) object. Given its transformational potential for manufacturing, 
this technology enables users to create smaller at batches of highly customizable 
products at declining prices. Recently, 3D printing has advanced to printing of body 
parts (titanium jaws, spines), exoskeletons, rocket parts as well as food. And given 
fallen prices, consumer – oriented devices have appeared on the market, allowing 
individuals to make three-dimensional solid objects locally (often using computer 
assisted design that can be downloaded from the internet). Usually, the link used in 
the printer is plastic but other materials (such as epoxy resin-silver, titanium, steel 
and wax) are equally available. Indeed, the revolutionary aspect of 3D printing can 
be found in its digital nature where physical objects become digital information that 
can be remixed, reformulated, improved and shared. Although desktop 3D printers 
are still relatively expensive, but as the performance improves and the cost of the 
printers and their inputs decline, it should be adopted by African countries. 
Specifically, the adoption of industrial printers for highly customizable objects that 
are relatively expensive and require replicable results. Essentially, this can be 
applied to the construction industry where 3D printed buildings can provide lower 
cost housing solutions as well as waste plastics conversion using on-demand 
manufacturing.  
 
CRYPTOGRAPHY (CRYPTOLOGY) is the practice and study of techniques for 
secure communications in the presence of third parties (Known as adversaries). 
Basically, cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols that prevent 
third parties or the public from reading private messages. Here, various dimensions 
in information security (data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation) are key features of modern cryptography. Essentially, the applications 
of cryptography include electronic commerce, chip-based payment cards, digital 
currencies, computer passwords and military communications. Clearly, 
cryptography is synonymous with encryption (conversion of information from a 
readable state to apparent nonsense).  
Consequently, the originator of an encrypted message shores the decoding 
technique only with intended recipients to preclude access from adversaries. 
Theoretically, it is possible to break such a system but it is infeasible to do so by 
any known practical means. Therefore, these schemes are termed computationally 
secure mechanisms. On one hand, ENCRYPTION is the process of converting 
information (plaintext) into unintelligible form (Cipher text). On the other hand, 
DECRYPTION is the process of moving from the unintelligible cipher text back to 
plaintext. However, a cipher (cypher) is a pair of algorithms that create the 
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encryption and the reversing decryption. However, the detailed operation of a 
cipher is controlled by the algorithm and a secret key (which is a short string of 
characters needed to decrypt the cipher text). Thus, a cryptosystem is the ordered 
list of elements of finite possible plaintexts, finite possible cipher texts, finite 
possible keys as well as the encryption and decryption algorithms which correspond 
to each key.  
 Technically, there are two types of cryptosystems: Symmetric and 
Asymmetric. In Symmetric systems, the same secret key is used to encrypt and 
decrypt a message. In contrast, asymmetric systems use a public key to encrypt a 
message and a private key to decrypt it. Similarly, cryptanalysis is the term used for 
the study of methods for obtaining the meaning of encrypted information without 
access to the required keys. In other words, it is the study of how to crack 
encryption algorithms or their implementations. Unlike ancient cryptography of the 
20th Century (using linguistic and lexicographic patterns); modern cryptography 
makes extensive use of mathematics, information theory, computational 
complexity, statistics, combinatorics, abstract algebra, number theory, finite 
mathematics and engineering. Unlike classical traditional ciphers (letters or digits) 
which only encrypted written language texts; modern computer ciphers can be 
characterized by their operation on binary bit sequences (usually in groups or 
blocks).  
 Traditionally, a BLOCKCHAIN is a growing list of records (blocks) which 
are linked using cryptography. Here, each block contains a cryptographic hash of 
the previous block, a timestamp and transaction data (in the form of markle tree). 
Technologically, as n open distributed ledger that can record transactions between 
two parties efficiently in a verifiable permanent way; blockchains typically 
managed by a peer-to-peer network collectively adhering to a protocol for inter-
node communication and validating new blocks. Here, once recorded, the data in 
any given block cannot be altered retroactively without alteration of all subsequent 
blocks (which requires consensus of the network majority). Basically, decentralized 
consensus has been claimed with a block chain. In fact, the invention of the block 
chain for BITCOIN made it to be the first digital currency to solve the double – 
spending problem without the need of a trusted authority or central server. As a 
blockchain formation, the main chain consists of the longest series of blocks from 
the genesis block to the current block. 
Structurally, a block chain is a decentralized, distributed and public digital 
ledger that is used to record transactions across many computers so that any 
involved record cannot be altered retroactively, without the alteration of all 
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subsequent blocks. Consequently, this allows the participants to verify audit 
transactions independently (inexpensively) while using a peer-to-peer network as 
well as distributed time-stamping server. In fact, the use of a block chain removes 
the characteristics of infinite reproducibility from a digital asset. Here, block hold 
bathes of valid transactions that are hashed and encoded into a merkle tree while 
each block includes the cryptographic hash of the prior block in the block chain 
(using dual linkage process). Basically, this linked blocks from a chain. However, 
the blocktime is the average time it takes for them to generate one extra block in the 
block chain. 
And by storing data across its peer-to-peer network, the block chain 
eliminates a number of risks that come with data being held centrally. Essentially, 
block chain security methods include the use of public-key cryptography (a long, 
random- looking string of numbers) as an address on the block chain. In contrast, a 
private key is like a password that gives its owner access to their digital assets or 
the means to otherwise interact with the various capabilities that block chain 
support. Generally, data stored on blockchain is considered incorruptible. Here, 
mining nodes validate transactions; add them to block building and then broad cast 
the complete block to other nodes. Indeed, the great advantage to an open 
(permission less or public) block chain network is that guarding against bad actors 
is not required and no access control is needed. This implies that applications can be 
added to the network without the approval or trust of others (using block chain as a 
transport layer). Operationally, block chain technology can be integrated into 
multiple areas; acting as a distributed ledger for crypto currencies (such as bit coin). 
It can also be used to create a permanent, public, transparent ledger system for 
compiling data on sales; tracking digital use and payments to content creators such 
as wireless users. Again, following the adoption of block chain, new distribution 
methods are available for the insurance industry (such as peer-to-peer insurance, 
parametric insurance and micro insurance) yet, the online voting and sharing 
economy is another application of the blockchain technology.  
Absolutely, a public blockchain has no access restrictions and anyone with a 
network access can send transactions to it as well as becoming a validator 
(participating in the execution of a consensus protocol). On the other hand, a private 
blockchain is permissioned and one cannot join it unless invited by the network 
administrators (with restricted participant and validator access). However, a hybrid 
blockchain is a combination between different characteristics (both public and 
private blockchains) has by design. Depending on the hybrid blockchain, its 
architecture, multicloud solutions allow to store data in compliance with general 
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data protection regulation. Instead of keeping transactions inside their own network 
of community run on private nodes, the hash (with or without payload) can be 
posted on completely decentralized blockchains. Yet, by submitting the hash of a 
transaction (with or without the sensitive business logic) on public blockchains 
(such as bitcoin or ethereum) some of the privacy issues are resolved (since no 
personal identifiable information is stored on the public blockchain layers). 
CRYPTOCURRENCY is a digital asset designed to work as a medium of 
exchange that uses strong cryptography to secure financial transactions; controlling 
of additional units creation as well as verification of assets transfer. Operationally, 
the decentralized control of each cryptocurrency works through distributed ledger 
technology known as blockchain which serves as a public financial transaction 
database. The summary of the evolution of cryptocurrency is shown in the table 3.2 
below:  
 
TABLE 3.2 CRYPTOCURRENCY EVOLUTIONS 
S/N YEAR INVENTOR/MODUS TYPOLOGY  
1.  1983 AMERICAN CRYPTOGRAPHER AND 
DAVID CHAUM  
ECASH  
2.  1996/1997 NSA: MIT AND AMERICAN LAW 
REVIEW  
CRYPTO ARTICLES  
3.  1998  WEI DAI E-MONEY  
4.  1998 NICK SZABO BIT GOLD  
5.  1998 HALFINNEY  REUSABLE 
CURRENCY 
SYSTEM  
6.  2009 SATOSHI NAKAMOTO BITCOIN  
7.  2011 SHA – 256 (HASH FUNCTION) NUME COIN  
8.  2011 SCRYPT (HASH-FUNCTION) LITE COIN  
9.  2011 HYBRID PROOF OF STAKE PEER COIN  
10.  2012  CRYPTOWORLD  ALTCOIN (BITCOIN 
ALTERNATIVES) 
11.  2014  JORDAN KELLEY  ROBO 
COIN/BITCOIN ATM  
12.  2017 BITCOIN FORKE BITCOIN CASH 
(BTC) 
13.  2018 RUGER VER JIHANWU BITCOIN CASH ABC 
(TRADED) 
14.  2018 CRAIG STEVEN WRIGHT CALVIN 
AYE 
BITCOIN SV 
(TRADED) 
 
Structurally, the validity of each cryptocurrency‟s coins is provided by a 
blockchain which solves the double-spending problem without the need of a trusted 
authority or central server. Thus, cryptocurrencies use various time stamping 
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schemes to “prove” the validity of transactions added to the blockchain ledger 
without the need for a trusted third party. Unlike the proof-of-work systems that run 
difficult hashing algorithms to validate electronic transactions; the proof-of-stake is 
a method of securing a cryptocurrency network and achieving distributed consensus 
through requesting users to show ownership of a certain amount of currency. Again, 
for the validation of transactions, successful miners obtain new cryptocurrency as a 
reward. On the other hand, a cryptocurrency wallet stores the public and private 
keys or addresses which can be used to receive or spend the cryptocurrency. 
Generally, cryptocurrency exchanges allow customers to trade cryptocurrencies for 
other assets while an initial coin offering (ICO) is a controversial means of raising 
funds for a new cryptocurrency venture. However, a cryptocurrency system in a 
decentralized network needs to overcome three main challenges:  
I. How to establish a consensus in a distributed network?  
II. How to discourage double spending behaviors?  
III. How to encourage proper transaction validation?  
Clearly, in the absence of a central authority, the cryptocurrency relies on a 
distributed verification of transactions, updating and storage of the record of 
transaction histories. This therefore necessitates that consensus between the user is 
maintained about the correct record of transactions. Finally, the legal status of 
crypto currencies varies substantially from country to country and is still undefined 
or changing in many of the countries. While some countries have explicitly allowed 
their use and trade, others countries may have restricted its operations. 
 Yet, since bitcoin, crypto assets have come a long way. In fact, what started 
as P2P (person to person) payment system has extended beyond the original 
designation of cryptocurrency. Indisputably, digital currencies can now be used for 
more than merely paying for goods and services. Thus, there are several use cases 
for crypto assets that demonstrate the extent of the fintech revolution and these 
include Digital Cash System, Programmable Money Contracts, Collateral 
Securities, Governance networks and Collectible Assets. Surely, crypto-currencies 
are still evolving and hence many of the envisioned use cases are yet to fully 
materialize. Notably, security tokens, hybrid tokens, derivatives, crypto 
commodities, privacy coins, stable coins, work tokens, discount tokens and other 
digital assets are yet to be established. However, these assets are likely to gain a 
foot hold as crypto adoption increases and ecosystem matures. In other words, the 
crypto space has evolved in leaps and bounds over the past decade. But for the 
future trend, it is anticipated that crypto assets will be serving functions that are yet 
to envisage or design.  
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4.0 AFRICA: DIGITAL EVIDENCES  
Indeed, over the past decades, there has been much debate about the potentials 
of information and communication technology for development. In fact, it has been 
argued that ICTs create new modes of connectivity and enable the integration of the 
marginalized businesses and regions into commercial value chains in the globalized 
world.  
Consequently, large programs and activities have been brought into being by 
private firms, donors, small business and national governments using ICTs to 
integrate their local economies into global markets (UNDP, 2012). However, the 
discourses on Africa‟s lack of development firmly resolve around the idea of global 
connectivity. But remedies are underway and Africa‟s connectivity is being 
addressed in various domains (at various scales) inside and outside of the continent. 
Notably, a more connected Africa lies at the core of many contemporary 
development programs. Similarly, Africans seems to be developing connectivity 
from within while some parts of Africa are being hailed as new frontiers of locally 
grown technological innovations. In fact, Africa may be experiencing a boom in 
technology entrepreneurship. Thus, high hopes have been invested in the 
continent‟s home-grown digital economy; envisioned to become an engine of rapid 
socioeconomic development and transformation.  
Specifically, within Africa, iHub in Nairobi (2010) was the first widely 
recognized organization using the hub nomenclature. Here, the main purpose of 
iHub was to connect individuals scattered around Nairobi while allowing them to 
collectively develop and implement ideas. Although Nairobi had a growing virtual 
tech community, they needed a physical space in which to interact, collaborate and 
gain more respect and attention from the outside world. In other words, it is all 
about getting cool people into a cool place with the goal of having something cool 
happen. However, the ambition behind iHub was fueled by the aspiration that 
Kenya and other African countries (following the arrival of broadband connectivity) 
could catch up with and become more closely connected to the Global North-West 
(Graham and Man, 2013). Basically, the ideology was that through iHub, the 
technology community, industry, academic, investors and venture capitalists could 
meet, share ideas and collaborate and thus transform their ideas into actions. In 
other words, the iHub “brand” was meant to provide “exposure” for innovators by 
pooling and providing access to opportunities such as jobs, freelancer group 
contracts or training. Here, the hub‟s community was structured to enable 
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knowledge sharing and mentorship thereby raising the skill levels of members (such 
as University graduates).  
In general, iHub was meant to be a place that attracted visits from local 
technology business people and representatives of international technology 
corporations while allowing young Kenyan innovators (occupying the hub) to make 
connections that they could not make otherwise.  
Essentially, the iHub organizers look for gaps in the local business ecosystem 
and try to fill them. And yet through the conceptual blending of connections made 
within the hub and those existing in its environment; iHub was envisioned to have 
positive effects on the local, national and regional level. Clearly, this vision proved 
hugely appealing for a range of actors seeking technology-driven economic 
development in Africa with ihub quickly living popularity and acceptance 
(Hersman, 2012).  
Subsequently, the confluence of several events and dynamics allowed the spread 
across Africa of organizations similar to iHub (resulting in at least partial 
recognition of hubs as a distinct organizational form). In fact, several organizations 
were founded after iHub (in 2010 and 2011). These include ACTIVE SPACES of 
Cameroon, KLAB of Rwanda, KINU of Tanzania, HIVE COLAB of Uganda, BON 
GOHIVE of Zambia, NAILAB of Kenya, BONTA LABS of Senegal, and CCHUB 
(Co-creation) of Nigeria.  
However, some of the above national labs formed AFRILABS (a network of 
tech innovation hubs in Africa) with the mission to build the capacity of hubs which 
support the growth of tech communities around them.  
Comparatively; it is akin to a traditional business association with independent 
member organizations. Geometrically, hubs were affirmed as an important Africa-
wide phenomenon through widely noted stock-taking exercises as shown in table 
4.1 below. In general, in the context of increasing attention from media and 
development organizations, iHub‟s vision of being a positive contributor to local 
economic development became attributed to African hubs. Unfortunately, hubs 
have consistently been understood to consist of a Wi-Fi-connected space with hot 
desks and meeting rooms, allowing for Laptop-based work. Here, activities have 
been described as including events, presentations, small innovation competitions, 
group meetings on topics of interest, training and mentorship sessions. 
Consequently, two divergent macro-level grand discourses about African hubs (as 
an organizational form) have developed out of the original ihub conceptualization. 
These are Network infrastructure expectation and incubator expectation. However, 
these expectations are not entirely contradictory. Rather, the distinction is their 
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implied level of optimism about hubs and the degree to which they retain elements 
from 
 
TABLE 4.1 AFRICAN HUBS: SELECTED REGIONAL LOCATIONS  
S/N COUNTRY HUBS LOCATIONS PROTOTYPE 
1.  MORROCO JOKKOLABS CASABLANCA 
NEWWORK LAB 
GIRLS IN TECH (MORROCO CHAPTER) 
OCP ENTREPRENEURSHIP NETWORK 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
HYBRID  
2.  SENEGAL JOKKOLABS DAKAR  
CTIC DAKAR 
AFRICA URING LAB 
MOBILE SENEGAL 
JJIBUENE TECH HUB  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
3.  GAMBIA JOKKOLABS BANJUL  
WOE LAB  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
4.  LIBERIA   
5.  COTE D‟VOIRE JOKKOLABS ABIDJAN  
THE WHUB  
AKENDEWA  
AMN CO-WORKING SPACE 
MWASI TECH HUB  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
6.  GHANA  MFRIDAY  
MELTWATER ENTREPRENEURIAL  
SCHOOL OF TECHNOLOGY 
(INCUBATOR) 
GSPACE  
LSPACE 
GHANA MULTIMEDIA INCUBATOR 
CENTRE  
MOBILE WEB GHANA 
KUMASI BUSINESS INCUBATOR  
OGUAA BUSINESS INCUBATOR  
HUB ACCRA  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
GOVERNMENT LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
7.  TOGO  MARA LAUNCH PAD  CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
8.   BENIN  E-TRILARS 
JOKKOLABS COTONOU   
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
8. A ETHIOPIA ICEADDIS  
X HUB 
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
9.  NIGERIA  L5LAB 
CO-CREATION HUB  
WENNOVOTION HUB  
TECHNOLOGY INCUBATION CENTRE 
MINNA TECH INCUBATION CENTRE  
INFORMATION DEVELOPERS  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
ACCELERATION/IDEA 
FOCUS HUB  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
GOVERNMENT LED  
GOVERNMENT LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
GOVERNMENT LED  
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ENSPIRE INCUBATOR  
CALABAR TECHNOLOGY 
INCUBATION CENTER 
BB MPH (400 N6)  
 
HYBRID  
10.  TUNISIA WIKI START UP CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
11.  MALI JOKKOLABS BAMAKO  CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
12.  BURKINA FASO YAM PUKRI  
JOKKOLABS OHAGADOU GOU 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
13.  CONGO 
REPUBLIC 
BANTU HUB  CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
14.  CONGO DEM. 
DE PUBLIC  
IMANI HUB  CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
15.  ANGOLA  ANGOLAN INSTITUTE OF SUPPORT 
FOR MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISE (INAPEM) (ICT 
INCUBATOR) 
GOVERNMENT LED  
16.  ZAMBIA BONGOHIVE ZAMBIA CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
17.  NAMIBIA NAMBIA BUSINESS INNOVATION 
CENTRE (NBIC) 
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED  
18.  BOTSWANA BOTSWANA INNOVATION HUB  
FIRST STEPS VENTURE CENTER  
GOVERNMENT LED  
HYBRID  
19.  CAMEROON ACTIVE SPACES  CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
20.  UGANDA  HIVE COLAB  
CTHEHUB  
QUTBOX HUB  
GRAMEEN FOUNDATION APPLAB  
WOMEN IN TECHNOLOGY UGANDA 
(WITU) 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
21.  SOUTH AFRICA  JOZIHUB  
CAPETOWN GARAGE  
BLACK GIRLS CODE  
THOUGHT WORKS  
TECHNBRAAM  
SILCON CAPE INITIATIVE  
IMPACT AMPLIFIER  
CODEBRIDGE  
ANGEL HUB  
EASTERN CAPE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 
CAPE INNOVATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE (CITI)  
SMART XCHANGE  
CODEDINBRAAM  
SOFTSTART TECHNOLOGY  
THE HOUSE 4 HACK  
MLAB SOUTHERN AFRICA  
START-UP GARAGE/9BMPH  
IMPACT HUB  
R FABS  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCITY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
GOVERNMENT LED  
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INVO TECH INCUBATOR  
THE INNOVATION HUB (T/H) 
STARTUP 90  
GRINDSTONE  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
GRIND STONE  
22.  MADAGASCAR 1 – HUB MALAGASY  
2 – HABAKA 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED 
23.  EGYPT  CAIRO HACKSPACE  
THE DISTRICT  
PLATE LABS  
ICE CAIRO 
FAB LAB EGYPT  
THE GREEK CAMPUS  
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CENTER  
ALEXANDRA HACKER SPACE  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID 
GOVERNMENT LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
24.  ZIMBABWE  SKY HUB INITIATIVE  
HYPERCUBE HUB  
MUZINDA UMUZI HUB  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
25.  MOZAMBIQUE MICTI TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS 
CENTRE 
GOVERNMENT LED  
26.  KENYA IHUB  
MLAB EAST AFRICA  
GROWTH HUB  
MAILAB  
C40 LAB  
AKIROCHIX 
LAKE HUB  
IBIZ AFRICA  
ILAB AFRICA  
FABLAB NAIROBI 
88MPH/STARTUP GARAGE  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED 
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION LED  
HYBRID  
27.  RWANDA KLAB  
THE OFFICE  
THINK TECHNOLOGY INCUBATOR 
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
28.  TANZANIA KINU INNOVATION AND CO-
CREATION SPACE  
TANZICT 
DAR TEKINO HANZA BUSINESS 
INCUBATOR  
BUNI HUB  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
 
HYBRID  
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY LED  
 
The more elaborate hub vision that iHub had established. Here, while the network 
infrastructure expectation assumes that startups are created within wider ecosystem 
(which the hub supports), the incubator expectation assumes direct creation of hubs 
ventures. Therefore, for hubs to lead to better outcomes, implementers and funders 
should move beyond the hype (acknowledging the indirect and indeterminate nature 
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of hub outcomes ) and working toward a more grounded understanding of what 
hubs can and  cannot do for African technology entrepreneurs. 
 Indeed, the advent of the internet in the mid-1990s stimulated the rapid 
diffusion of e-government systems to automate core administrative tasks;, improve 
the delivery of public series and promote transparency and accountability. 
Consequently, African countries have invested more in core government 
administration systems (such as financial management, customs, tax management) 
than in transactional government to citizen and government to business services. 
However, emerging evidence suggests that digital technologies have made elections 
freer and fairer by improving voter registration and reducing error in voting as well 
as better monitoring so as to curb electoral fraud and violence. But significant 
barriers to more informed voting remains since digital technologies (by giving elites 
new ways of manipulating information to their advantage) can also disempower the 
poor. 
Again, digital citizen voice initiatives for improving services delivery have 
multiplied rapidly but the focus is on digital channels that are initiated by civil 
society organizations and donors to pressure governments. Here, the African 
analysis distinguishes fire cases by whether the mechanism for expressing citizens 
preferences is individual or collective; whether the CSO or donor that led the 
initiative also had explicit partnerships with the concerned government; and 
whether there was also parallel offline mobilization accompany the digital voice 
channel as shown in table 4.2 (world bank, 2016). Here, impact is measured in two 
ways: citizensuptake (given that uptake can be considered a necessary condition for 
government responsiveness) and government action to resolve the service issue (as 
the ultimate object of the citizen voice initiative). 
 
TABLE 4.2 AFRICAN DIGITALCITIZENENGAGEMENT: 
CLASSIFICATION CASES 
S/N CASE LOCATION ADDITIONAL 
OFFLINE 
MOBILIZATION 
CSO  
PRAISE 
WITH 
GOVERNMENT 
COLLECTIVE 
FEED 
BACK 
IMPACT 
CITIZEN 
UPTAKE 
GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE 
1.  LUNGISA  YES YES NO LOW HIGH 
2. U.REPORT UGANDA YES YES YES HIGH LOW 
 
3. HUNDUMA KENYA NO NO NO LOW LOW 
4. DARAJ 
MAJI 
MATONE 
TANZANI
A 
YES NO NO LOW LOW 
5. SAUTI ZA 
WANANCHI 
TANZANI
A 
NO YES NO LOW LOW 
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 As a public good, IDENTITY is now recognized as a sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) target and the best way to achieve this goal is through 
digital identity (digital ID) systems, central registries storing personal data in digital 
form as well as credentials that rely on digital mechanisms to authenticate holders 
identity. Operationally, some African countries have some form of digital ID 
scheme tied to specific functions and serving a subset of the population. However, 
only few countries have a multi-purpose scheme that covers the entire population. 
Yet, unlike developed countries, African countries often lack robust civil 
registration systems and physical IDs while building their ID systems on a digital 
basis as well as leap frogging the more traditional physically based system. Here, 
identification (rather than e-services) is the major goal and the potential risk 
associated with leap frogging to civil identification system is that in many cases, the 
youngest population (0-18) is excluded and continues to be unregistered. Indeed, 
evidence of the impact of digital ID is still scanty but there are noticeable effects in 
three areas:  
I. Efficient management of social welfare programs,  
II. Removing ghost workers from government payroll and  
III. Improving the sanctity of elections. 
Specifically, the benefits of digital ID in reducing the leakages for social 
protection or security programs, health insurance and pension schemes due to 
duplicates, ghost beneficiaries and corruption are occurring in Egypt, Ghana and 
South Africa. Again, Nigeria recently implemented a digital ID system for civil 
servants that enabled it to remove about Sixty-two thousand ghost workers while 
saving about one billion dollars annually (Celb and Clark, 2013). Similarly, Nigeria 
used digital IDs to prevent vote rigging in her 2015 elections. Practically, the 
system enrolled about Sixty-eight million voters using biometrics and card readers 
to authenticate voters (and hence preventing duplicate votes). Although there were 
some operational challenges at the polls, the election was fairly conducted. 
However, other countries such as Kenya and Somalia may not have reaped the same 
benefits from the biometric voter IDs. In fact, digital ID schemes tend to be 
complex and often politicized which are subject to failure to deliver on high 
expectations. Thus, for a digital ID system to be effective, it must be rooted in an 
upgraded legal framework that considers the accessibility and protective measures 
of the system. Other factors include clear definitions for the interconnectively and 
interoperability with other registries and coordinated investment in ICT throughout 
the country so as develop a reliable and secured platforms. 
Indeed, the internet and associated technologies have the potential to expand 
health services in African countries, increase health system efficiency and lead to 
better patient outcomes. Operationally, E-health encompasses the full range of uses 
of information and communication technologies ranging from traditional 
administrative reporting systems to broader Health Management Information 
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Systems (HMIS) to telemedicine, electronic medical records, clinical decision 
support and patient portals as well as full range of technologies including internet 
and mobile applications. As an African case study, the Ethiopian government had 
previously trained and deployed over forty thousand Health Extension Workers to 
serve rural and other hard-to-reach populations (Bilal, et-al 2011). However, these 
workers are often isolated and lack the capacity to prioritize urgent but 
unpredictable antenatal and postnatal care. Thus, to improve information flows, 
Ethiopian development partners developed the Frontline SMS platform. Using this 
tool, the health workers can register pregnant women and newborns; receive 
automated short message service (SMS) reminders to notify them of key 
appointments as well as tracking the stock of essential medicines.  
 Clearly, an evaluation of the new tool showed that by using existing mobile 
networks and low-cost feature phones; the system improved the ability of health 
workers to deliver services and improve health outcomes. Specifically, more 
women had skilled assistance with their delivery, more women delivered in health 
centres while other women received antenatal care. The new system also improved 
health workers capacity to respond in a timely manner and showed that in a context 
(where internet coverage is low) mobile phones can be an effective way to improve 
health system performance. In general, replacing paper-based patient registers with 
electronic registers could help improve local health care quality and inform 
management decision making. Again, increasing the use of e-health and m-health 
approaches and tools can support improved decision making by frontline providers 
inclusive of GPS-enabled tools and harnessing the revolution that smart phone 
access to broadband content will bring about in African countries. Consequently, 
more emphasis is needed to expand and improve the use and functionality of open-
source software platforms as well as supporting open source frameworks.  
 Essentially, DIGITAL FINANCE makes businesses more productive and 
allows individuals to take advantage of opportunities in the digital world which 
helps streamline public sector service delivery. However, more than two billion 
people have no access to any financial services. Therefore, digital payment systems 
help overcome barriers to accessing financial services. Specifically, mobile money 
schemes allow people who own a phone but do not have a bank account to make 
and receive payments. In fact, theses systems can take off and reach massive size 
rapidly. For example, the Nigerian 2012 Growth Enhancement Support Scheme 
introduced mobile technology to transfer fertilizer subsides directly to farmers. 
Evidently, this action took the Nigerian government out of the business of procuring 
and distributing fertilizer. In fact, the adopted transfer system relied on a database 
of more than ten million farmers (as registered recipients of the subsidies) who now 
have a better chance of gaining access to formal or regulated financial services 
(Grossman and Tarazi, 2004). However, there are four major innovations in digital 
payments: Wrappers (credit cards), Mobile Money System (M-PESA), Credits and 
local digital currencies (alternative units) and Digital Currencies (Bitcoin or 
34 
 
cryptocurrencies). Practically, in contrast to cash, electronic transfer could leave a 
trail that can aid low enforcement. In other words digital technologies could also 
help establish registries of beneficial ownership of financial and commercial 
holdings and transaction monitoring systems. Thus, the opportunities of digital 
finance for inclusion, efficiency and innovation will likely outweigh the negative 
risk factors.  
 Statistically, Africa ranked among the largest continent in mobile penetration 
with a higher growth rate of mobile phone subscribers whereas there are a lower 
number of bank branches. Yet, Africa has witnessed a very high growth of cellular 
phones usage that was around six hundred and fifty million customers in 2012. 
Here, the banking services started slowly in 2000 in Zambia and South Africa 
(which launched the biometrical payment system in 2012). Since then, there has 
been a rise of other countries such as Kenya with the launch of M-PESA (a money 
transfer through SMS) and M-Shwari (a banking service without folders). However, 
the informal finance which appears to be important in the African context can be 
reabsorbed by the formal system which allow data availability and good investment 
as well as well informed governmental financial policy implementation (Nguena, 
2017). Although mobile banking in Africa is at its infancy, mobile penetration is 
influenced by regulation in the mobile phone market whereas mobile banking is 
influenced by regulations in the banking industry.  
 Indeed, research evidence has shown that sub-saharan Africa is the only 
region where the share of adults with a mobile money account exceeds ten percent 
between 2014 and 2017. However, as at 2014 East Africa was the region‟s mobile 
money hub. Yet, mobile money accounts have since spread to new parts of sub-
saharan Africa. In fact, the share of adults with a mobile money account has now 
surpassed thirty percent in Cote d‟voire and Senegal as well as forty percent in 
Gabon (World bank, 2017). Table 4.3 shows comparative African financial 
indicators.  
TABLE 4.3 COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP (2017): SELECTED 
AFRICAN ECONOMIES  
A B C D E 
S/N ECONOMY ADULTS WITH AN 
ACCOUNT 
GAP BETWEEN 
MEN AND WOMEN 
(%) 
GAP BETWEEN 
RICHER AND 
POORER (%) 
1.  ALGERIA 43 27 13 
2.  BENIN 38 20 11 
3.  BOTSWANA 51 09 27 
4.  BURKINA FASO 43 17 27 
5.  CAMEROON  35 09 16 
6.  CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
14 08 08 
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7.  CHAD 22 14 13 
8.  CONGO DEM. REP 26 - 14 
9.  CONGO REP 26 10 13 
10. COTE D‟IVOIRE 41 11 12 
11. EGYPT, ARAB REP 33 12 21 
12. ETHOPIA 35 12 21 
13. GABON 59 10 15 
14. GHANA 58 08 16 
15. KENYA 82 08 18 
16. LIBERIA 36 15 15 
17. MALAWI 34 08 21 
18. MALI 35 20 07 
19. MAURITANIA 21 11 13 
20. MAURITIUS 90 06 06 
21. MOZAMBIQUE 42 18 25 
22. NAMIBIA 81 - 17 
23. NIGER 16 09 08 
24. NIGERIA 40 24 25 
25. SENEGAL 42 08 13 
26. SOUTH AFRICA 69 - 11 
27. TANZANIA 47 09 16 
28. TOGO 45 15 18 
29. TUNISIA 37 17 26 
30. UGANDA 59 13 20 
31. ZAMBIA 46 11 24 
32. ZIMBABWE 55 08 19 
33. UNITED KINGDOM 96 - - 
34. UNITED STATES 93 - 13 
 
NOTES: (I) Only statistically significant gaps are shown  
(II) Gaps that fall within the reported margin of error in an economy are 
considered to be statistically insignificant indicated by the use of a dash.  
(III) Gaps in account ownership between adults in the richest sixty 
percents of households and those in the poorest forty percent.  
     (IV) Data are based on household income quintiles.  
SOURCE: Global Findex Database  
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5.0 AFRICAN ECONOMIES : DISRUPTIVE RESPONSES  
Indeed the potential gains from technological progress for workers and 
consumers in African countries are large. Specifically, these gains of digital 
technologies are as follows:  
A. They can create jobs and increase earnings in the small information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector as well as sectors that use ICT 
B. They can increase worker productivity by augmenting human capital and 
(especially critical  for the poor) connecting people to work and markets  
C. They can also benefit consumers by lowering prices and expanding the variety 
of goods and services available to consumers. 
However, while digital technologies can raise productivity and enhance overall 
welfare, associated labormarket disruptions can be painful and can result in higher 
inequality between high-skilled workers and unskilled workers. Yet the impact of 
digital technologies on jobs depends on the type of tasks and how technology either 
complements or substitutes workers in those tasks. In fact, a job comprises many 
tasks and each characterized by the skills most used to perform it. These include 
cognitive, socio-emotional or manual skills and by how amenable it is to 
automation or codification. In other words, technology is skill-based while 
technological progress makes the jobs challenge more complex. Since digital 
technologies have different applicability to different kinds of work, the extent of 
disruption across countries will reflect differences in economic and occupational 
structures.  
For instance, numerical clerks or secretaries (often users of digital technologies) 
also perform many tasks that can be easily automated. By contrast managers or 
software developers while intensively using digital technologies complement them 
by way of not easily substituted by machines and for occupations that use little 
technology some are hard to automate such as Hair dressers while others could be 
automated such as Assemblers (as shown in figure 5.1). 
 Comparatively, more advanced economics can expect larger disruptions in the 
near future since they use more technology at work and are experiencing faster 
changes in skill requirements (Crafts 2015). And while they have smaller shares of 
employment in routine occupations susceptible to automation; their higher wages 
make it easier for automation to be economically viable. On the other hand, low-and 
middle income countries can also expect substitution disruptions (with a time lag) 
given their rapid technological adoption and large number of workers in routine 
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occupations. However their low skill base suggests critical challenges ahead. But in 
poorer countries (like Africa) where wages are lower and technological adoption is 
slower while the disruptions are like to arrive slowly; and hence giving more time 
for policies and institutions to adapt. Basically all this has implications for countries 
to develop modern skills among children and youth as well as coming up with a 
strategy of the retraining and lifelong learning of the current stock of older workers.  
 Consequently, the current challenge is to start reforms to maximize the digital 
dividends and to prepare for any disruptions. However, skill systems vary widely 
and not all are prepared to equip workers with skills that complement technology. 
Therefore, this process needs to start very early in life since education and training 
systems are notoriously difficult to change. Thus, any reform takes many years to 
have effects which explain the race between skills and technology. In fact, the 
confluence of two digital forces will dramatically reshape tomorrow‟s workplace 
that leads to a sharp reduction in the reduction in the traditional employer- 
employee relationship. Here, new platforms will allow economic activity to be 
organized in ways that shift much of what was traditionally accomplished by full-
time workers within an organization to a crowd of individual entrepreneurs and on-
demand workers. The implication being an economy that increasingly relies on 
short-term freelance relationships rather than on full-time employments. 
 Again, artificial intelligence and robotics enabled technologies are getting 
increasingly better at the cognitive and physical tasks that comprise much of 
today‟s work; presaging the automation of complex human activities ( such as 
vehicle driving or project management) as well as disrupting a range of occupations 
(such as law, consulting, retailing or transportation). Thus, the confluence of all 
these factors leads to a labor market in which full-time jobs may be broken up into 
tasks and projects. Operationally, this will make it easier to substitute capita in the 
form of automation technologies for human labor and talent. Indeed, such a future 
of large scale crowd-based capitalism will require fundamental rethinking of 
postsecondary education. This, to help those workers, new university like 
institutions are needed to provide structure and pedagogically sound transition 
education. In fact, as the cognitive capabilities of digital change expand, students 
may need less education in STEM courses while benefits from a greater emphasis 
on design thinking, entrepreneurship and creativity to prepare them for a micro-
entrepreneurial career.  
 Yet the challenges facing present millennial workforce seem quiet daunting. 
Perhaps as digital machines compel us to reshape our world of work; they will also 
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show a path toward the more equitable society as desired. Thus in response to this 
confluence of a need for more jobs in places where they do not currently exist and 
the spreading of digital connectivity among billions of the world‟s population: 
millions of people have turned to outsourced digitally mediated work as a way to 
transcend some of the constraints of their local labor markets. In fact, many 
governments, third sector organizations and private sector actors see significant 
developmental potential in digital labor. Here, jobs can be created for some of the 
worlds poorest by taking advantage of connectivity and the willingness of an 
increasing number of firms to outsource business processes. In other words, anyone 
can do any work from anywhere and this could bring significant economic benefits 
to workers in parts of the world where good job are hard to come by. However the 
nature of the actual transaction and information costs in market exchanges are 
important in exploring disintermediation and digital technologies (as shown in table 
5.1). Clearly, the property rights approach highlights additional directions for 
deeper scrutiny of digital technologies in terms of the nature of transactions, 
underlying institutions and digitally driven externalities that are crucial in 
characterizing how disintermediation practically occurs (Foster and Graham, 2017). 
 Perhaps creating formal jobs may be the best policy that is consistent with the 
global agenda to seize the benefits of technological change. Unfortunately, in many 
African countries, most workers remain in low-productivity employment (usually in 
the informal sector with little access to technology) while lack of quality private 
sector jobs leaves talented young people with few pathways to wage employment. 
Thus for societies to benefit from the potential that technology offers thy would 
need a new 
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FIGURE 5.1 TECHNOLOGY AND JOBS INTERACTION BY OCCUPATION 
VARIATIONS: PROBABILITY OF BEING COMPUTERIZED AND INTENSITY IN USE 
OF ICT WORK 
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(4 –) = (< Average)   INTENSITY IN USE OF ICT OF WORK 
  (TECHNOLOGY COMPLEMENTING WORKERS) 
 
NOTES: (I) The probability of being computerized is obtained from Frey and 
Osborne (2013)  
  (II) ICT intensity is an index between O (no use of technology) and 
16 (most use of technology)  
   (III) ICT implies information and communication technologies.  
  (IV) Inserted lines represent the average values of ICT intensity (X-
GXIS) and of computerization (Y-axis) across the pooled sample of 
countries with STEP household surveys (World Bank, 2016). 
 
TABLE 5.1 DIGITAL INFORMATION DISINTERMEDIATION: 
TRANSACTION COST PERSPECTIVES 
S/N UNDERLYING 
APPROACH 
KEY CONCEPTS PERSPECTIVES ON DIGITAL 
INFORMATION, TRANSACTIONS 
AND DISINTERMEDIATION 
1.  NEOCLASSICAL a) Drivers and Constraints 
of Market Exchange 
Explore how transaction costs of 
market exchange change as a result of 
improved information flows  
I) Information cost affected by digital 
information flows  
II) Ability of ICT/Digital connectivity  
to disintermediate 
III) Disintermediation through digital  
platforms  
IV) Constraints in Digitally enabled  
exchange (competition rules) 
2.  Property Rights a) Nature of Transactions  Examine underlying properties of 
transactions and how they affect 
digitally enabled transactions 
I) Shared resources, product  
requirements  
II) Complexity of transactions and  
ability to ascertain and monitor quality 
3.   b) Institutional Frameworks Explore Digital information within a 
constellation of rules rights, and norms 
that orient transactions  
I) Underlying rights and norms that  
characterize exchange which  
affects digitally enabled transactions  
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II) Nature and makeup of  
institutional Bodies 
III)  Potential use of strategy and  
power in orienting Digital transactions  
4.   c) EXTERNALITIES  Explore the spillover effects of digital 
information flows and problems.  
I) Impact on other elements of  
transaction costs  
II) Digital disintermediation and  
reintermediation 
 
social contract centered on larger investments in human capital and progressively 
provided universal social protection (as shown in figure 5.2). However, social 
inclusion requires fiscal space and many African countries lack the finances 
because of inadequate tax bases, large informal sectors and inefficient 
administration (World Bank, 2019). In-fact, the advent of a jobless economy raises 
concern because tasks traditionally performed by humans are being (or are at risk of 
being) taken over by robots, especially those enabled with artificial intelligence. 
Comparatively, young workers may be more affected by automation than older 
workers.  
 However, technological progress leads to direct creation of jobs in the 
technology sector. Here, people are increasingly using smart phones, tablets and 
other portable electronic devices to work; organize their finances, etc. Here, 
workers create the online interfaces that drive growth and with consumer interest 
changing fast; there are more opportunities for careers in mobile app development 
and virtual reality design. Also, technology has facilitated the creation of jobs 
through working online or joining the gig economy. Similarly, technology increases 
proximity to markets while facilitating the creation of new efficient value chains. In 
other-words, during the process of technology adoption, some workers will be 
replaced by technology while workers involved in routine tasks that are „codifiable‟ 
are the most vulnerable as well as some service jobs that are vulnerable to 
automation. Several examples include Robot industrial workers, Robot financial 
Analysts, Robot lawyers, Autonomous Buses and Driverless vehicles.  
 Indeed, technology is changing the skills being rewarded in the labor market. 
Here, the premium is rising for skills that cannot be replaced by robots: general 
cognitive skills such as critical thinking and socio-behavioral skills such as 
managing and recognizing emotions that enhance team work. Clearly, workers with 
these skills are more adaptable in labor markets. Similarly, technology is also 
disrupting production processes by challenging the traditional boundaries of firms; 
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expanding global value chains as well as changing the geography of jobs. Again 
technology is changing how people work by giving rise to the gig economy in 
which organizations contract with independent workers for short-term engagements. 
 
FIGURE 5.2  WORK DYNAMICS AND RESPONSES  
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Basically, technology is disrupting the demand for three types of skills in the 
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 Consequently, automation has disproportionately reduced the demand for less 
skilled workers while the innovation process has generally favored the highly 
educated workers. Therefore, a big question is whether workers displaced by 
automation will have the required skills for new jobs created by innovation. Even 
though low-wages countries may not invest in the development of labor-saving 
innovations, they import labor-saving ideas from advanced economies. In-fact, the 
mechanization of agriculture in emerging economies represents the largest global 
shift in work. Therefore, cities in emerging countries must generate abundant new 
jobs to employ the farmers displaced by agricultural industrialization. However, if 
robust global connections arrive too slowly in Africa, then industrialization may no 
longer be a plausible path to job creation. Indeed, the future of work is uncertain 
since innovation may outpace automation while globalization may move quickly 
enough than industrialization allows 
 
FIGURE 5.3 FUTURE EMPLOYMENT SHAPE: AUTOMATION AND 
INNOVATION FORCES  
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skills into relevant technical fields of expertise (such as teachers that are good at 
web design and actuaries that are proficient in big data analytics) are likely to be in 
high demand. Specifically, in job polarization (expansion of high and low skill jobs 
coupled with the decline of middle-skill jobs); the demand for workers who can 
undertake non-routine cognitive tasks (such as high-skilled research) is increasing 
as well as the relative demand for workers able to handle non-routine tasks that 
cannot be automated easily (such as food preparation). On the other-hand, the 
demand for workers for procedural routine tasks (which are often performed in 
middle-skill jobs such as data entry) is declining because of automation processes.  
 Indeed, creating a skilled workforce for the future of work rests on the 
growing demand for advanced cognitive skills, socio-behavioral skills and 
adaptability. However, technological change makes it harder to anticipate which 
job-specific skills will thrive and which will become obsolete in the next future. As 
clearly indicated in figure 5.4, past shifts in skill requirements prompted by 
technological progress took centuries to manifest themselves while in the digital 
era, advances in technology call for new skills manifest quickly. Essentially, this 
ability to adapt quickly to changes is increasingly valued by the labor market. Here, 
the critical traits is ADAPTABILITY (ability to respond to unexpected 
circumstances and to unlearn and relearn quickly) which requires a combination of 
certain cognitive skills (critical thinking and problem solving) as well as socio-
behavioral skills (curiosity and creativity). 
 
FIGURE 5.4 TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: GLOBAL TIME TREND 
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NOTES: 
A:  AD105= PAPER MAKING (This was invested in AD105 and was used as  
the main writing medium in the 3rd century) 
B:  AD 1040 = MOVABLE TYPE PRINTING (This was introduced in 1040 and  
became widespread in China in the 17th century) 
C:  AD 1794 = MECHANICAL LOOM (This was invented in 1784 and it  
displaced almost all hard weavers in the U.K by 1860) 
D:  AD 1870 = PRODUCTION LINE (The production line appeared in 1870 and  
became part of Henry Ford‟s mass production of cars in the U.S around  
1914).  
E:  AD 1989 = WORLD WIDE WEB (The first start-up for business process  
outsourcing (BPO) in India appeared in 2002 and around 2.8 million people  
were employed in the BPO industry in 2012.  
F:  AD 2004 = DIGITAL WALLET (Wechat pay was introduced in China in  
2013 while its mobile payment users reached 600 million and total  
transactions surpassed us $8.1 trillion in 2017). 
 
 
6.0 AFRICAN ECONOMIES: DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS 
Regrettably, a rapid demographic transition in sub-saharan Africa is fueling a 
youth bulge and urbanization while contributing to migration flows in a way that 
will affect the future of work. Statistically, the region‟s population is projected to 
nearly double in the next two decades: from approximately 900 million in 2015 to 
1.7 billion in 2040 (Chio, 2019). In fact, more than half of the anticipated growth in 
global population between now and 2050 are expected to occur in Africa while half 
of the population in sub-Saharan Africa is under age twenty-five years (IMF, 2018). 
Again, between 2017 and 2030, the labor supply in the region is estimated to 
increase by one hundred and ninety-eight million with eleven million young 
Africans expected to enter the labor market each year for the next decade. Thus, as 
the labor force increases, there is a need to create twenty million jobs each year 
(ILU, 2018). Yet Africa is projected to experience rapid population growth over the 
next decades while sub-saharan Africa is urbanizing at lower per capita gross 
domestic product than other regions. However, Africa‟s growing population will be 
largely city dwellers but with low incomes.  
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Unfortunately, this low income means that sub-saharan Africa‟s urbanization is 
not accompanied by critical infrastructure investments in physical capital (transport 
and housing) as well as human capital (schools, health clinics, etc). In fact, those 
low investments undermine the agglomeration benefits of cities; raise the costs of 
doing business and make cities uncompetitive. Again, Africa‟s population transition 
is linked to increased levels of migration that is within the continent while 
contemporary African migrants are mostly young people (usually below thirty-five 
years of age). Consequently, the intersection of the population boom, youth bulge, 
urbanization and migration will have significant implications for cities and urban 
areas work. However, about 82% of the sub-saharan Africa‟s poor people still live 
in rural areas (earning their living primarily in farming). In other words, the 
combined trends of digitization and globalization are likely to affect no more than 
twenty percent of the workers due to the structure of the African economies as well 
as the low levels of formalization. However, most employment is in agriculture and 
consumer services of the informal sector that is characterized by income volatility.  
 Essentially, the digital economy offers African business and workers of the 
informal sector, an opportunity to realign markets by minimizing information 
asymmetry which has multi-dimensional benefits (including making formalization 
easier). Surely, by connecting more informal businesses with consumers, digital 
technologies can strengthen the backbone of sub-saharan African economies. 
Specifically, in low-income environments, low-skill-based digital technologies 
(through instructional videos, voice activated tactile screen and simple to use 
applications) can empower low-skilled informal workers to perform higher skilled 
tasks and learn as they work. Again, such technologies can enable workers without 
any collateral but with the ability to make savings to access credit and insurance 
products based on their recorded savings and purchase histories. However, 
appraising the level of informality is challenging because it is an endogenous 
feature of the African economy. Comparatively, informality can shape the growth 
path of African economies (by absorbing a large shore of unskilled labor or 
constraining the fiscal space). In contrast, the level of economic development 
(growth, poverty, inequality) can also affect the size and composition of the 
informal sector. Furthermore, trade policies and fiscal outcomes are key correlates 
of informality while trade reforms can shape the informal sector through 
competition.  
 Although there is growing consensus on the role that digital technologies 
play in the enhancement of business activities and economic development; there is 
still little evidence on the uptake and usage of these technologies by informal firms; 
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However, evidence shows that mobile phones are widely used among informal 
businesses as compared to other information and communication technologies 
(Choi, 2019). Indeed, women‟s access to information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) can be conceptualized as including availability, affordability 
and skills needed to use a set of ICTs as well as being affected by structural and 
gendered social norms governing mobility reproductive and productive roles within 
households as well as the use of space and time which structures access (Gester and 
Zimmermann, 2003; Kleine, 2010). Specifically, gendered digital divides 
structurally limit women‟s opportunities to harness ICT‟s emancipator potentials 
because of marginalization in terms of access to time, resources, education, 
mobility, technophobia, safety, religious and cultural constraints, socio-economic 
status, age as well as perceived relevance of technology to women‟s lives. Again, 
ICTs can also be used as a tool to control, harass and oppress women since many 
women experience severe constraints in using ICTs effectively as a result of 
cultural norms and power hierarchies (Buskens and Webb, 2014). Yet, within the 
ICT4D discourse, women are often trained as either consumers of ICTs whose 
relative lack of access represents a lost revenue opportunity for ICT-related goods 
and services (emerging or untapped market) or as budding entrepreneurs who just 
need to be equipped with ICTs to be successful (UNCTAD 2014). Clearly, both 
opportunities exist to a point but overemphasizing them may carry the risk of 
underplaying broader structural and cultural factors. Therefore, ICT-driven 
women‟s entrepreneurship could play an important role in increasing gender 
equality, creating employment, improving economic growth as well as reducing 
poverty levels at individual, household and community levels.  
 Although the major reason for many youth adoption of ICT facilities is 
entertainment; the new digital technologies are having wide-ranging effects on 
youth transitions. Essentially, new opportunities for work and study are opening up 
while the interactive and decentralized nature of these new technologies is 
providing youths with many more opportunities to obtain information outside the 
traditional channels. Apart from the direct jobs creation, ICTs provide information 
about non-ICT job openings to youth. In fact, online job databases offer information 
to those with internet access while mobile phones are particularly important for job 
information. In some Africa countries, many youths have identified mobile phones 
as essential for contacting employers and getting contacted about job openings, 
particularly in remote areas and areas of high crime (World Bank, 2007). Again, the 
newer uses of mobile technology are also proving useful for job information for 
African youths. Similarly, New ICTs also offer the potential for a second chance at 
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work for youth with disabilities. Specifically, speech synthesizers and text 
magnifier programs can allow visually impaired youth to use ICTs for work, while 
e-mail and SMS offer greater flexibility in work-related communication needs for 
the hearing impaired.  
 Indeed, youth use of ICTs matters indirectly for development outcomes 
through the impacts on youth transitions and directly through the large youth 
contribution to overall ICT use. And given the vast amount of information 
available, many youth may be unprepared to sort through and judge what is reliable 
and what is not. Thus, there is need to help youth become safer and more effective 
users of the internet. However, the main ICT priority for governments is to ensure a 
good investment climate that allows private companies to serve the growing 
demand for ICT services by enacting regulations that provide for easy entry and 
competition. In particular for youths, it is also important to provide good regulatory 
conditions for modes of communal access such as internet cafes. Furthermore, 
governments need to experiment with ways to provide youth with the skills needed 
to best take advantage of new technologies through teaching global languages; 
providing support for local language content development; and developing ways to 
teach youth responsible and safe use. Furthermore, rigorous evaluations of such 
policies are needed to find out what works and to share lessons across African 
countries.  
 
 
7.0 AFRICAN ECONOMIES: POLICY OPTIONS  
Practically, as digital development proceeds from emerging to transitioning 
and then to transforming, policy reforms because more complex. Hence it may be 
useful to consider a sequence of policy priorities in line with technology‟s 
increasing penetration as shown in table 7.1 (World bank, 2016). Clearly, in 
countries where the digital economy is still emerging and internet use is low, the 
priority will be to lay the foundations. However, technology adoption and the 
quality of complements vary not only across countries but also across sectors and 
across firms in the same sector. Thus, African countries need to look at the digital 
economy as a source of growth and jobs. In fact, they should focus on enforcing 
existing business regulations and competition and antitrust laws. In other words, 
they should focus on reducing the implementation gap in enforcing existing laws 
while required changes for implementation could be handled through secondary 
legislation or guidelines.  
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Basically, the use of digital technologies requires basic cognitive skills such 
as literacy and numeracy. Yet, a well-educated worker in the 21st century also needs 
skills that are easily transferable across jobs and occupations and that will help 
respond to changing labor market demands: higher order cognitive, socioemotional 
and technical skills. Therefore, countries with strong skill development systems are 
best prepared to leverage digital technologies; to manage some of the labor market 
disruptions that technology creates; and to ensure that the benefits of digital 
technologies are widely shared. Consequently, every African country should have 
multiple skill development systems. In other words, incorporating advanced ICT 
skills in the general curriculum can teach computational thinking in the emerging 
African economies. For instance, incorporating coding in general education can 
strengthen not only ICT skills but also critical thinking that can be used to teach 
logic and learning strategies for solving problems, designing projects and 
communicating ideas.  
Again, addressing shortages and deficiencies in the teaching of science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) requires preparing and equipping teachers 
properly as well as including STEM across the educational system. It also requires 
creatively involving the employers, connecting the teaching and research activities 
as well as establishing financial incentives or compensatory mechanisms to make 
STEM education viable and affordable to underrepresented groups.   
 
TABLE 7.1 EMERGING AFRICAN COUNTRIES: POLICY PRIORITIES  
S/N POLICY GOALS DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION NEEDS 
(A)  Registrations: A business environment in 
which firms can leverage the internet to 
compete and innovate for the benefit of 
consumers 
(I) Low barriers to  
Internet adoption including 
access, affordability and basic 
open and safe issues: trade and 
basic competition issues 
(II) Effective 
regulation 
Competition and 
enforcement 
(including ease of 
market entry) 
(III) Critical „new  
economy‟ regulation 
including platform 
competition and the 
legal basis for private 
sector data collection.  
(B)  Skills: workers, entrepreneurs and public 
servants who can take advantage of 
opportunities in the digital world. 
(I) Digital literacy and  
foundational basic cognitive 
skills and socioemotional skills  
(II) Higher  
Order cognitive 
and 
socioemotional 
skills 
(III) Advantaged ICT  
skills and STEM 
Education as well as 
lifelong learning 
(C)  Institutions: An accountable government that 
effectively uses the internet to empower its 
citizens and deliver services 
(I) Adoption of  
Informational services and 
monitoring by public sector and 
non-state providers  
(II) Effective e- 
Government 
delivery systems, 
provider 
management and 
citizen 
engagement  
(III) Widespread  
citizen use of E- 
Government service and 
participatory policy 
making 
(D)  Accountability: A Transparent Governance 
System 
(I) Increased Electrical  
Accountability  
(II) Trust and  
safeguards 
against Privacy 
and Security  
(III) Social protection  
systems for a changing 
labor market 
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Indeed, the labor market disruptions that accompany technological change 
increase the demands on active labor market policies and social assistance systems. 
These disruptions are likely to be greatest for workers in routine occupations. On 
one hand, some workers are going to need intermediation and retraining services to 
find new jobs. On the other hand, if they have difficulties transitioning, they may 
need social assistance. Thus, by giving workers a stake in digital capital could 
diversify workers assets and reduce their costs of displacements through pension 
funds, mutual funds or digital firm intervention (Freeman, 2015). Therefore, the 
solution is to protect workers rather than jobs and to level the playing field for 
regulations and taxation across work contracts. Here, the first step is to do away 
with regulations that almost prohibit flexible work arrangement while the second 
step is to reform tax systems that tax part-time work at higher per hour rates than 
full time work. Reforms are also necessary in working time arrangements and table 
7.2 presents different reform programs classifications as applicable (Kuddo, 2015; 
Choi, et. al., 2019, World Bank, 2019).  
 Essentially, government policies and regulation of the internet will help to 
shape the digital economy. Specifically, through their policies for the ICT sector, 
governments and regulatory agencies create an enabling environment for the private 
sector to build networks, develop services and provide content and applications for 
users. After market competition and private participation, another policy ingredient 
is independent regulation: establishing ICT regulatory agencies that are independent 
of leading operators and of government departments. In fact, effective regulation 
creates a level playing field for operators and helps promote market entry. 
Furthermore, telecom sector regulation should work primarily in favor of the 
consumer addressing market failure, fostering effective competition, protecting 
consumer interests as well as increasing access to technology and services. 
Particularly, the regulator should seek to ensure that the benefits from technological 
change, greater efficiency and reduced costs are passed on to consumers rather than 
appropriated in higher profits for private firms or extortionate taxes to governments.  
 Empirically, data are the lifeblood of decision making and the raw material 
for accountability. And without high quality data providing the right information on 
the right 
TABLE 7.2 POLICY REFORMS: PROGRAM CLASSIFICATIONS 
S/N INTERVENTION 
SECTORS 
REFORM CATEGORIES REFORM SUB CATEGORIES 
1)  Social Insurance Areas  (A) Contributory Pensions  (i) Old age pension (All schemes, 
national, civil servants, veterans, 
other special) 
(ii) Survivors pension (All schemes, 
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national, civil servants, veterans 
other special) 
(iii) Disability pension (All schemes, 
national, civil servants, veterans, 
other special)  
  Supporting Social Insurance  (i) Occupational insures benefits 
(ii) Paid sickness leave benefits 
(iii) Health  
(iv) Maternity/paternity benefits 
2.  LABOR MARKET 
AREAS 
(A) Labor market policy  
measures (active LM programs) 
(i) Training (Vocational, life skills, 
cash for training)  
(ii) Employment incentives/wage 
subsidies  
(iii) Employment measures for disabled  
(iv) Entrepreneurship support/startup 
incentives (cash and in kind grant, 
microcredit) 
(v) Labor market services and 
intermediation through PES 
(vi) Other active labor market programs  
  (B) Labor market Policy support 
(Passive LM Programs) 
(i) Out-of-work income maintenance 
(unemployment benefits, 
contributors)  
(ii) Out-of-work income maintenance 
(unemployment benefits, non-
contributory) 
3.  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
AREAS 
(A) Unconditional Cash Transfers (i) Poverty targeted cash transfers and 
last resort programs  
(ii) Family/children/orphan allowance 
(including orphan and vulnerable 
children benefits) 
(iii) Non-contributory funeral grants, 
burial allowances  
(iv) Emergency cash support (including 
support to refugees/returning 
migrants) 
(v) Public charity 
  (B) Conditional cash transfers  
(C) Social pensions (non- 
contributory ) 
(i)Conditional cash transfer 
(i)Old age social pensions  
(ii)Disability benefits/war victims 
noncontributory related benefits 
(iii)Survivorship  
  (D) Food and In-kind Transfers  (i) Food stamps rations and vouchers  
(ii) Food distribution programs  
(iii) Nutritional programs (therapeutic, 
supplementary feeding)  
(iv) In-kind/non-food support (education 
supplies, free texts uniforms for 
schools)  
  (E) School Feeding  (i) School Feeding  
  (F) Public works, workfare and direct 
job creation 
(i) Cash for work  
(ii) Food for work (inclusive of food for 
training and food for assents) 
  (G) Fee waivers and subsidies  (i) Health insurance exemptions and 
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reduced medical fees 
(ii) Education fee waivers  
(iii) Food subsidies 
(iv) Housing subsidies and allowances 
(and “privileges”)  
(v) Utility and electricity subsidies and 
allowances 
(vi) Agricultural inputs subsidies  
  (H) Other Social Assistance  (i) Scholarships/education benefits  
(ii) Social care services, transfers for 
care givers  
(iii) What is left out from above 
categories 
4.  Private Transfers Area  (A) Domestic Private Transfers  (i) Domestic transfers inter-family in 
kind gifts and monetary transfers  
(ii) Alimony (Divorce and Food) 
(iii) Income and support from 
charity/private zakat, support for 
churches and NGOs  
  (B) International Private Transfers  (i) Remittances from Abroad  
things at the right time, designing, monitoring and evaluating effective policies 
becomes almost impossible. Therefore, recognizing the potential for harnessing the 
ongoing explosion of data, this paper calls for a data revolution that could aid in the 
achievement of the sustainable development goals. Yet, in harnessing this data 
explosion for development, there are two overlapping innovations: „bigdata‟ and 
„opendata‟. Here, the big data are voluminous or fast which comes from satellite 
and ground sensors and as by products from electronic transactions inclusive of 
mobile phone calls. In contrast, open data are those that are freely and easily 
accessible, machine readable and explicitly unrestricted in use. In other words, open 
data are not necessarily big while big data are not necessarily open. Thus, there is 
continental need for sustained commitment to openness and for investment in high 
quality data if the dream of a data revolution is to be realized. In fact, African 
countries can seek ways to discourage data hoarding by adequately funding data 
holders and showing them that they can attain a higher profile by opening their data. 
Similarly, Donors and International can support these actions through funding, 
capacity building and ensuring that their own data are also open.  
 As an environmental concern, smart public policy can help make the most of 
the new technologies for monitoring and reducing pollution. And apart from 
stronger requirements for public disclosure of monitoring data; governments can 
play an important role in setting standards for data collection, reporting and sharing; 
offering guidance on best practices for use of technologies; as well as rating 
performance devices used by consumers. Thus, to keep up with the pace of 
technological change, it is critical for governments to regularly review policies and 
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standards in recognition of new data services that can form an important part of the 
broader air quality management strategy.  
 Indeed, a potential symbiotic relationship exists between the development of 
information and communication technologies and increasing energy access in 
Africa. Specifically, the SMART GRID (defined as a broad range of sensors, meters 
and controls enabled by information technology as well as large-scale and real-time 
data collection) can enhance the operational efficiency of the electricity system by 
optimizing energy transactions. Therefore, having high-quality easily accessible 
information on energy resources, demand and usage is crucial to supporting the 
formation of government policies and can be a catalyst for commercial investment. 
Clearly, agriculture is becoming increasingly knowledge-intensive and high-tech. 
Operationally, digital soil maps, remote sensing and global positioning system 
(GPS) guidance are critical tools for modern farmers. Also, „Big data‟ for precision 
agriculture increases yields and efficiency. However, these high-tech tools mostly 
benefit big farms that can make large investments in technology. But, there are also 
many innovative ways in which illiterate and disadvantaged people use digital 
technologies (such as mobile phone applications). Therefore, greater efforts to close 
the digital divide in rural areas can have great payoffs. Yet, in the long run, that the 
internet can have an even greater impact on rural growth depends on finding 
sustainable business models to encourage its spread in the poorest parts of Africa. 
 Regionally, Africa is growing more connected and digital development is 
accelerating. However, countries in the region need to adopt a bottom-up approach 
to unlock the power of technological entrepreneurship as shown in figure 7.1 
(World Bank group, 2017). Illustratively, this figure presents the Top-down and 
bottom-up framework for sub-saharan Africa‟s innovation ecosystem. 
Unfortunately, these bottom-up initiatives have often been neglected and yet they 
are key complement for success. Consequently, this problem presents a unique case 
to explore opportunities offered by the increasing digitization of the region to create 
conditions for new jobs. Essentially, this will require critical interventions that start 
with a coherent pragmatic national ICT strategy; building infrastructure that 
supports the digital economy as well as producing a strong and large pool of digital 
entrepreneurs and high-skilled youth with strong ICT skills base. In addition to 
investing in physical infrastructure expansion and improvements in the regulatory 
environment, African countries must act fast to create the human capital conditions 
that are needed to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies for job creation 
in the region clearly, the basis of this strategy is to train and enable a critical mass 
of inventors and entrepreneurs to develop and scale digital technologies to boost the 
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productivity of all workers (such as low-skilled workers in current and new 
occupations) and to strengthen the  
 
FIGURE 7.1 AFRICA‟S INNOVATION SYSTEM: FRAMEWORK INITIATIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
delivery of education and health services. Again, African regional policy makers 
must address critical constraints such as the funding of startups at their early stage 
and incorporate entrepreneurship in the mainstream educational curriculum.  
 Operationally, African ecommerce is well underway involving business-to-
business, business-to-consumer, business-to-government as well as goods and 
services. With action, e-commerce can become a force for sustainable development. 
Yet, there are challenges to African‟s e-commerce growth and these include 
uncompetitive delivery infrastructure, fragmented markets and rising barriers to 
cross-border e-payments. Thus, as a future policy direction, African government 
should support the creation of national or regional e-commerce multistakeholder 
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associations to champion policies; develop the African Digital trade and digital 
economy strategy; and support an inclusive pan-African perspective for e-
commerce growth with entrepreneurs need connectivity. Again, digital policies 
should improve interoperability between international payment service providers, 
local banks and regional payment ecosystems.  
 
8.0 CONCLUSION  
Indeed, the promise of digital technology adoption will not be realized 
without government attention to support essential analog complements. Among 
other things, Africa‟s digital transformation needs competition, capital and capacity. 
Specifically, the African government should close the current gap in digital 
infrastructure and enhance affordable broadband access with improved regulatory 
frameworks. Public-private investments are also required in electricity and transport 
(logistics) infrastructure while favorable trade-policies and broader business 
environment reforms remain crucial to enhance African firms‟ participation in 
global value chain as well as foreign direct investment attraction. Furthermore, the 
African policy makers should create the enabling environment to establish effective 
early warning systems (including insurance markets) to identify risks in time for 
effective mitigation. They should also coordinate regional organizations, financial 
regulators and development partners toward common objectives on tax policy, 
reducing remittances costs and providing development assistance to enhance social 
protection coverage. For the sake of boosting human capital, African governments 
should use targeted measures to train a critical mass of investors and entrepreneurs 
to develop and scale digital technologies to boost the productivity of all workers 
(especially low-skilled workers in current and new occupations) and to strengthen 
the delivery of education and health services.  
However, additional knowledge may be needed on several matters to help 
guide future policies. Critically, there is a need for better understanding of how to 
identify, empower and train transformational inventors and entrepreneurs (such as 
those with high talents and low incomes). Although digital technologies can 
promote access to human capital services, a better understanding is needed of the 
extent of the digital technologies on the quality of human capital service delivery. 
In other words, would digital technologies mainly complement already high-
performing human capital workers to perform better or can they improve the 
performance of the low-performing workers using country-specific sectoral cases. 
Statistically, adequate measurements are needed on many fronts including better 
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measures of the quality of education, innovator and entrepreneurial skills as well as 
worker skills (especially soft skills and adaptation skills).  
In conclusion, while the digital revolution is inevitable, the outcome will 
depend on good policies. However, policy responses should strike the right balance 
between enabling digital progress and addressing risks. Yet, considering the 
inherent global reach of these technologies, regional and international cooperation 
will be the key to developing effective policy responses. In fact, the more willing 
the society is to support those who are left behind; the faster the pace of innovation 
that it can accommodate and still ensure that all citizens ends up better-off. And 
with the right inclusive policies and legislation, the digital revolution could be a 
new engine of growth and prosperity for African economies in the twenty-first 
century.  
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